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 What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, 
and anthro-pomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, 
which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically 
and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, 
and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one 
has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn 
out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pic-
tures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. 
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche1
INTRODUCTION 
OPULAR thought divides constitutional adjudication into two 
categories. Either judges are faithfully and directly enforcing 
the Constitution as written, or they basically are making it up as 
they go along, creating rules with no roots in the Constitution and 
imposing them on the rest of society.2 People can be excused for 
subscribing to this dichotomous vision; Supreme Court Justices 
have pressed it on them. In his eloquent dissent in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice Scalia la-
mented that the Court had strayed from its proper role, the “essen-
tially lawyers’ work” of “ascertaining an objective law.”3 Half a 
century before him, Justice Owen Roberts described the judicial 
task as similarly straightforward: The Court’s function, he wrote, 
P 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in The Portable 
Nietzsche 42, 46–47 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1954). 
2 Like many other concepts, the dichotomy between legitimate enforcement and il-
legitimate judicial legislation finds its most strident articulation in political rhetoric 
and the popular press. Statements by elected officials excoriating so-called “activist 
judges” are a dime a dozen. For a notable one, see the statement of President Bush 
endorsing the Federal Marriage Amendment. Press Release, George W. Bush, State-
ment by the President (May 17, 2004),www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/ 
print/20040517-2.html (“The sacred institution of marriage should not be redefined by 
a few activist judges.”). In the popular press, the most striking recent example is Mark 
R. Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying America (2005). Aca-
demic commentary tends to recognize that “activist” is an epithet with no substantive 
content. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Ju-
dicial Activism?, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1401, 1401 (2002). 
3 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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was merely “to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked 
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the 
latter squares with the former.”4
Academics are less tempted by what I will call the fallacy of di-
rect enforcement. They understand that courts deciding constitu-
tional cases apply a vast body of doctrine that contains complexi-
ties and distinctions well beyond those of the constitutional text. 
But scholars and Justices alike frequently fall prey to a related and 
more insidious lure, which I will call the fallacy of perfect enforce-
ment. The fallacy of perfect enforcement assumes that doctrinal 
rules are simply a way of getting the right answers in constitutional 
cases. The meaning of the Constitution, on this understanding, is 
precisely and exhaustively specified by actual or hypothetical adju-
dicative outcomes: A governmental action is constitutionally sound 
if and only if a court would uphold it, and unconstitutional if and 
only if a court would strike it down.5
My purpose in this Article is twofold. First, in Part I, I will show 
that both direct enforcement and perfect enforcement are illusory. 
Judges never have done either of them, and for good reason. In 
place of these two spurious alternatives, Parts II and III will pre-
sent a model that describes what judges actually do in constitu-
tional cases: create and apply rules that do not simply articulate the 
demands of the Constitution but are shaped by a wide variety of 
factors and, in some cases, direct outcomes inconsistent with con-
stitutional requirements. The debunking of the enforcement falla-
cies and the development of the alternative model will be fairly 
straightforward; indeed, in one form or another, the model is 
widely accepted. But this model often is forgotten, and the second 
and more novel thing this Article will do is to put the descriptive 
account to normative work. Part IV will analyze the rules created 
4 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). 
5 The idea that statements about law are a shorthand for the predicted outcomes of 
adjudication is associated with a form of legal realism—the predictive theory of law. 
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 173 
(1920) (asserting that statements about law are “prophecies of what the courts will do 
in fact”). That theory has, of course, been criticized on philosophical grounds. See, 
e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 1–3 (2d ed. 1994). This Article will offer a 
criticism of the theory as it applies to constitutional law, but my method is not juris-
prudential. Rather, my basic claim is that an unthinking equation of constitutional 
meaning with the outcome of adjudication warps doctrine in certain predictable ways. 
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in a number of doctrinal areas, and Part V will discuss some of the 
difficulties that the Court faces in creating and maintaining its doc-
trinal rules. Part VI will demonstrate a mistake that has not yet 
been systematically studied: the mistake of succumbing to the fal-
lacy of perfect enforcement. In a striking number of cases the 
Court has forgotten the reasons behind particular rules and has 
come to treat them as nothing more than statements of constitu-
tional requirements. This mistaken equation of judicial doctrine 
and constitutional command tends to warp doctrine, frequently at 
significant cost to constitutional values; it also distorts the relation-
ship the Court has to other governmental actors and to the Ameri-
can people. 
I. THE ENFORCEMENT FALLACIES 
The fallacy of direct enforcement requires little discussion; 
judges and scholars have frequently noted that there is a distinction 
between the Constitution itself and the rules that courts apply in 
deciding cases. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Graves v. New 
York ex rel. O’Keefe, noted the tendency to “encrust” the Constitu-
tion with doctrine and “thereafter to consider merely what has 
been judicially said.”6 Likewise, then-Professor Hans Linde ob-
served “It is natural that judge-made formulas, once pronounced, 
take on a life independent of their supposed sources in the Consti-
tution, and that the application of these judicial formulas should 
become the daily rule in constitutional litigation and their reex-
amination the exception.”7
In these formulations, however, the implicit assumption is the 
fallacy of perfect enforcement: that doctrine is and should be a 
means to the end of reaching correct decisions—and, more signifi-
cantly, that judicial decisions are correct according to the court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution.8 In contrast to the eminently re-
sistible siren of direct enforcement, perfect enforcement probably 
will not strike most readers as immediately problematic. After all, 
6 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
7 Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 197–98 (1976). 
8 I add the qualifying phrase to make clear that the perfect enforcement fallacy does 
not require the assumption that courts are in fact correct in their interpretation of the 
Constitution. The point is simply about the relationship between the outcome of a 
case and what the court believes the Constitution requires or prohibits. 
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courts uphold constitutional laws and strike down unconstitutional 
ones—don’t they? 
Indeed they do—in much the same way, and to much the same 
extent, as they acquit innocent people and convict guilty ones. 
Which is to say, with something considerably less than perfect ac-
curacy, and deliberately so. In the criminal context, it is common-
place to distinguish between legal and factual guilt. Acquittal does 
not mean that the defendant did not commit the offense; it means 
that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The possibility remains that the defendant is in fact guilty. 
Legal rulings may not track the underlying facts perfectly. 
A similar divergence between ruling and reality can occur even 
with issues that seem purely legal, for constitutional questions 
“frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of fact.”9 Consider 
the substantial effects test of Commerce Clause jurisprudence: 
Congress may regulate activities—at least commercial activities—
that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce.10 But 
the primary responsibility for deciding whether a substantial effect 
exists lies not with the courts but with Congress. Judicial review of 
a congressional determination that such an effect exists is deferen-
tial: Courts ask not whether the substantial effect exists, but 
whether Congress rationally could have believed it to. In conse-
quence, much like a court applying the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard in a criminal case, a court reviewing Commerce 
Clause legislation under the rational basis “substantial effects” test 
will regularly and predictably uphold regulation of activities that 
do not, in fact, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
The rational basis standard of review underenforces the underlying 
constitutional rule (what I will call, following Professor Mitchell 
Berman, the “constitutional operative proposition”11). Unconstitu-
tional laws will be upheld, and the outcome of adjudication will not 
reflect the true meaning of the Constitution. 
An objection presents itself: Perhaps this simply shows that ra-
9 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 246 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part). 
10 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–10 (2000) (citing United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–60 (1995)). 
11 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004) 
[hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules]. 
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tional basis is part of the meaning of the Constitution. From our 
current Court-centered perspective, the claim might seem plausi-
ble. Adopting the perspective of Congress demonstrates that it is 
not. A conscientious legislator, aware of judicial doctrine, will 
know that the Court will uphold regulation of any commercial ac-
tivity that might rationally be believed, in the aggregate, to sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. But in deciding whether a 
vote in favor of a proposed law is consistent with her oath to up-
hold the Constitution, should she ask herself whether she might ra-
tionally believe the aggregated activity has such a substantial ef-
fect? Surely she should ask instead whether she does believe this. 
That is, it would not be an act of good constitutional faith to vote in 
favor of a law regulating an activity she did not believe substan-
tially affected interstate commerce on the grounds that the con-
trary view would be rational.12
The matter becomes even clearer if we return to the criminal 
context. There, a person contemplating murder will know he will 
not be convicted unless he commits the crime in such a manner as 
to allow proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet not even the most 
hardened realist would suggest that the criminal law forbids only 
those crimes that leave sufficient evidence to convict. The law pro-
hibits murder tout court; the perfect crime is still a crime. Thus, the 
rules that courts apply (convict if all elements are proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt; strike down if Congress could not rationally 
have found a substantial effect on interstate commerce) are not the 
same as the rules that actors seeking to comply with the law should 
consider. They are not the true law. 
12 Thus, as James Bradley Thayer put it, citing Cooley: 
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure as being, in 
his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed on the bench, 
when this measure, having been passed by the legislature in spite of his opposi-
tion, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty, although he has in 
no degree changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional. 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893) (citing Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of 
the American Union 68 (6th ed. Little, Brown 1890) (1868)). “[T]he ultimate ques-
tion,” Thayer asserted, “is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but 
whether legislation is sustainable or not.” Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted). For a modern 
statement, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional In-
terpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975). 
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In the context of the Commerce Clause, the constitutional op-
erative proposition might be (and I shall assume here that it is) the 
substantial effects test.13 The rational basis standard of review, like 
a burden of proof, is designed to guide judicial decisionmaking. 
“Strike down if Congress could not rationally have found a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce” is what I will call (again fol-
lowing Professor Mitchell Berman) a “constitutional decision 
rule.”14
This Article seeks to demonstrate just how many doctrinal areas 
profitably may be understood from the perspective that separates 
decision rules from constitutional operative propositions. Not all of 
the demonstrations will be as clear-cut as the analysis of rational 
basis review in the context of the Commerce Clause.15 There is 
room for disagreement about the status of particular doctrinal for-
mulations—whether they are constitutional operative propositions 
or decision rules—and about the content of the constitutional op-
erative propositions themselves. But those are questions about the 
application of the model, not its basic validity. I will first develop 
the model in more detail, then use it to analyze and critique several 
areas of doctrine. 
II. THE DECISION RULES MODEL 
Thus far I have argued that the rules courts apply in deciding 
constitutional cases do not necessarily reflect the underlying mean-
ing of the Constitution. To say that doctrine may diverge from the 
Constitution may not be to say anything more than that the Court 
gets some cases wrong.16 The insight of the decision rules model is 
different. It is that the Court intentionally crafts decision rules that 
depart, in some cases quite substantially, from its understanding of 
13 I will discuss the operative proposition underlying the Commerce Clause in 
greater detail in Section IV.B. 
14 See Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 9. 
15 Indeed, I admit that even the operative proposition of the Commerce Clause may 
be hard to discern. My claim here is only that the rational basis standard of review is 
not part of it. 
16 In his Harvard Law Review foreword, Professor Akhil Amar pursued essentially 
this claim, comparing the outcome of cases under the Court’s doctrine to the out-
comes suggested by constitutional text and structure and finding the latter more ap-
pealing. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Docu-
ment and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 26–27 (2000). 
ROOSEVELT_BOOK 10/27/2005  6:18 PM 
1656 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1649 
 
constitutional operative propositions. The Court prescribes doc-
trinal rules that predictably lead to adjudicative outcomes that are 
erroneous in terms of its understanding of the actual meaning of 
the Constitution. 
This is not necessarily a criticism of the Court. As I will explain 
in Part III, there are good reasons to do so. Nor is it a novel insight. 
Professor James Bradley Thayer, arguing for judicial restraint in 
1893, well understood that he was advocating a “rule of administra-
tion” under which some unconstitutional laws would be upheld.17 
The Court should strike down only manifest violations of the Con-
stitution, he argued, because Congress has “primary authority to 
interpret.”18 In modern times, the germinal moment of the idea is 
Professor Lawrence Sager’s article Fair Measure: The Legal Status 
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms.19 Professor Sager argued 
that the Court underenforced some constitutional operative propo-
sitions—in particular, equal protection—but that other actors 
should understand themselves as bound to the full extent of the 
operative proposition.20
The distinction between the perspective of courts deciding cases 
and other actors attempting to understand their constitutional ob-
ligations bears an obvious relation to Professor Meir Dan-Cohen’s 
account of a similar divergence in criminal law, between what he 
called “conduct rules” and “decision rules.”21 The connection to the 
17 Thayer, supra note 12, at 139–44. 
18 Id. at 136. The idea is ancient, according to Thayer, who did not see himself as ar-
ticulating anything new. Id. at 140. In Fletcher v. Peck, for example, Chief Justice 
Marshall noted that a Court that believed a law was unconstitutional should nonethe-
less strike it down only if “[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law 
[were] such that the judge [felt] a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility 
with each other.” 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). 
19 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213–15 (1978); see also Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 107–08 (1976). 
20 Sager, supra note 19, at 1221. 
21 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 627–28 (1984). Professor Dan-Cohen’s main sug-
gestion was that it was desirable in many cases for actors to believe that they were 
bound by norms (conduct rules) different in material ways from those the courts 
would apply (decision rules). Id. My point in this Article is similar, though in some 
ways the converse: courts and other actors over time regularly come to confuse the 
decision rules with the conduct rules (what I call constitutional operative proposi-
tions). This is undesirable, for a number of reasons. See infra Section VI. 
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constitutional context was made explicitly by Professor Akhil 
Amar22 and emphatically by Professor Mitchell Berman, whose 
Constitutional Decision Rules offers the decision rules model as a 
general account of constitutional law.23 Professor Berman’s article 
in many ways constitutes the starting point for this one, which at-
tempts to use the model to offer a more broad-ranging normative 
critique of existing doctrine, and in particular to highlight the char-
acteristic error that occurs when the Court loses sight of the dis-
tinction. 
The model can be simply stated. The Constitution contains cer-
tain rules that empower or restrain actors—these are the constitu-
tional operative propositions. In deciding constitutional cases, the 
Supreme Court is called upon to determine whether a power has 
been exceeded or a restraint violated. To do this, it first decides 
what the constitutional operative proposition is. In some cases this 
will be easy—for instance, the requirement that Senators be at 
least thirty years old. In others, it will be harder—enforcing the 
demand that no state deny any person the equal protection of the 
laws requires the Court to decide what “equal protection” means. 
In the difficult cases, the constitutional operative proposition will 
not be identical to the text; it will be a more general principle such 
as “the government may not treat some people worse than others 
without adequate justification.”24
Second, the Court adopts a decision rule to implement the op-
erative proposition. One possibility would be a decision rule that 
22 Amar, supra note 16, at 48 n.67 (citing Dan-Cohen, supra note 21, at 625).  
23 Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 8–10. For another notable contribution 
in a similar vein, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 
(2001). Professor Fallon notes that the Court does not, as it has sometimes claimed to 
do, simply lay a statute next to the Constitution to see whether the statute is sound. 
Rather, it “devises and then implicates strategies for enforcing constitutional values,” 
which “do not (and should not) always reflect the Court’s direct assessment of consti-
tutional meaning.” Id. at 5–6. Professors Fallon, Berman, and Sager deserve credit for 
offering the model as a fairly general account of constitutional adjudication. Fallon, 
supra, at 5–6; Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 8–10; Sager, supra note 19, at 
1213–14. I attempt here to extend their insight by offering a more wide-ranging nor-
mative critique of doctrine and an explicit consideration of the problem of time. 
24 Similar phrasings abound. Professor Berman offers the proposition that “govern-
ment may not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a le-
gitimate state interest.” Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 9. Sager suggests 
the formulation that “[a] state may treat persons differently only when it is fair to do 
so.” Sager, supra note 19, at 1215.
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closely tracks the operative proposition. Such a decision rule would 
not amount to direct enforcement, for the Court still would have to 
select and assign a burden of proof. A decision rule modeled on the 
operative proposition and containing a more-likely-than-not bur-
den of proof is perhaps the closest the Court could come to perfect 
enforcement. Applying that decision rule to particular cases will 
produce precedents that flesh out the underlying operative propo-
sition, specifying, for instance, what does or does not constitute an 
adequate justification for a particular classification. A substantial 
amount of constitutional adjudication consists of this sort of com-
mon law-style development. But the Court also might choose deci-
sion rules that differ substantially from the operative propositions 
they are intended to implement.25 In such circumstances, the out-
comes of adjudication under the decision rule will differ from out-
comes under the operative proposition. Why the Court might 
choose such a rule is the subject of the next Part. 
III. CONSTRUCTING DECISION RULES: THE FACTORS IN PLAY 
Adopting a rule that predictably produces erroneous results 
might seem odd at first blush. Surely, one might think, the Court’s 
first (and perhaps only) obligation is to enforce the Constitution’s 
operative propositions. Why should it try to do anything else? 
One answer is that decision rules are unavoidable—and not just 
because general propositions do not decide concrete cases. A court 
must give structure to the adjudicatory process; it must determine 
and assign burdens of proof, production, and persuasion.26 Still, the 
necessities of adjudication alone do not explain why the Court 
might choose a decision rule that departs substantially from the 
operative proposition. 
The answer here is more complex. A number of factors might 
make the Court decide to adopt a decision rule that varies signifi-
cantly from the constitutional operative proposition. In what fol-
25 As Berman puts it, “[n]onstandard decision rules are standard fare.” Mitchell N. 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 833 (2005) [hereinafter 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering]. 
26 See Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 93–99 (discussing different burdens 
of proof and when they should be used). 
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lows, I set out a non-exhaustive list.27 None of the factors is likely 
by itself to provide a complete explanation of a particular decision 
rule, and they may point in different directions. The value of an 
explicit analysis of the factors is that by articulating what consid-
erations drive the creation of a particular decision rule, we get a 
better sense of its purpose and therefore a greater ability to ana-
lyze its wisdom and efficacy. The factors on which I focus are those 
I see at work in the doctrinal areas discussed in subsequent Parts. 
A. Institutional Competence 
Institutional competence could be a general answer, subsuming 
many of the other factors I will consider below. Here I use it in a 
narrow sense—getting the right answer to a particular question. 
Judges are good at answering some questions, and legislatures are 
good at answering others. What questions fall within the respective 
competences of the judiciary and the legislature is a matter on 
which there is far less agreement. Judges might be particularly 
good at interpreting legal documents or at construing constitu-
tional provisions relating to the judiciary.28 Classical legal thought 
took them as experts in classification—in determining whether an 
activity was commerce or manufacture, for instance, or whether a 
business was affected with a public interest.29 It has been suggested 
that they have some advantage in determining America’s funda-
mental values,30 though this proposition also has been attacked 
27 For a different analysis of factors guiding the creation of decision rules, see Ber-
man, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 92–96. 
28 This latter point is one element of a weak reading of Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” 
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1120–21 (2001). 
29 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: 
The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 27–30 (1992); William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of 
Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 4–6, 90 (1998); 
Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The 
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, in 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3, 3–9 
(Rita J. Simon ed., 1980). 
30 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court 
at the Bar of Politics 24–27 (2d ed. 1986) (“[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing 
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. . . . This is 
crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society . . . .”). 
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forcefully31 and seems to have fallen from favor. They may be 
poorly suited to gauge the necessities of administration in unusual 
environments such as prisons.32 It also is generally conceded that 
they are less able to resolve complicated factual questions, such as 
the economic effects of a particular law.33
If a constitutional operative proposition sets up a question that is 
within the peculiar competence of courts, then the Court might de-
cide to adopt a decision rule that closely tracks the operative 
proposition and grants no deference to other actors. If the question 
falls within the legislative competence, the Court may respond in 
one of several ways. It might nonetheless mold its decision rule 
closely to the operative proposition and refuse to defer. This could 
be simple obstinacy—if the legislature is substantially more capa-
ble of discerning the right answer, then correct outcomes will likely 
be maximized by simply accepting the legislative judgment—but 
there might be reasons to do so. Such reasons will typically be one 
or more of the factors discussed in the following subsections, which 
on their own or in combination might outweigh a lack of superior 
institutional competence. 
Alternatively, a court confronting a question within the legisla-
tive competence might craft a deferential rule—such as the rational 
basis test—that will tend to uphold almost all legislative acts, even 
those that the judges would deem unconstitutional if not defer-
31 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The people know that their 
value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law school—maybe better.”). 
32 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an inordi-
nately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government.”).
33 As Justice Jackson wrote in a letter to then-Circuit Judge Sherman Minton, “in 
any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court 
will accept that judgment. . . . When we admit that it is an economic matter, we pretty 
nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may judge.” Letter from Robert H. 
Jackson to Sherman Minton (Dec. 21, 1942), 1–2, quoted in Barry Cushman, Formal-
ism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1146 
(2000); see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 156 (1997) (“[A] rigorous judicial ex-
amination of effects on commerce would entail making economic judgments of a kind 
ill-suited to courts.”). 
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ring.34 This is not, I hasten to add, equivalent to deferring to the 
legislature’s interpretation of the Constitution. A deferential deci-
sion rule defers not to the legislature’s determination as to what 
the relevant operative proposition is, but to its determination that a 
law complies with that operative proposition. 
Last, the court might adopt a decision rule that departs from the 
operative proposition by substituting a question within the judicial 
competence. This technique preserves judicial authority at some 
cost to the underlying operative proposition. It will appeal to 
courts enamored of judicial supremacy—the court may not be de-
ciding the right question, but at least it is the court that is deciding. 
B. Costs of Error 
No court will get the right answer every time, even the Supreme 
Court, which as Justice Jackson famously commented is not final 
because it is infallible, but rather infallible only because it is final.35 
Mistakes are inevitable, and they generally will come in one of two 
forms: erroneously permitting an unconstitutional government ac-
tion, and erroneously forbidding an action that is constitutionally 
sound. The relative costs assigned to these different kinds of errors 
will suggest deferential, non-deferential, or even anti-deferential 
decision rules. That is, a court might underenforce an operative 
proposition by adopting a rule that predictably upholds violations 
but strikes down almost no valid acts. It might attempt simply to 
enforce the proposition by adopting a rule that attempts to mini-
mize the total number of errors without reference to kind. Or it 
might overenforce by adopting a rule that predictably strikes down 
valid laws but upholds almost no violations. Rational basis review, 
I have suggested, is frequently an example of the first; strict scru-
tiny, I will argue, is frequently an example of the last. 
One might attempt to do this cost-benefit analysis at the whole-
sale level. When a court erroneously upholds unconstitutional gov-
ernmental action, some individual’s constitutional rights have 
probably been violated—though frequently in a manner that the 
34 This is precisely Thayer’s point: Judges should uphold laws they would have op-
posed on constitutional grounds as conscientious legislators. Thayer, supra note 12, at 
144. 
35 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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political process can correct.36 When it erroneously strikes down a 
valid governmental act, the American people (for a federal act) or 
some subgroup thereof (for a state act)37 have been denied the abil-
ity to govern themselves—and in a manner that will take a consti-
tutional amendment, or a changed Court, to reverse. Both these 
things are bad, of course, but those who find the latter worse than 
the former will tend to support across-the-board calls for judicial 
restraint.38 Conversely, those who feel the opposite will tend to call 
for aggressive judicial supervision of the elected branches. 
It makes a good deal more sense, however, to consider the mat-
ter at the retail level. Here one would proceed by identifying a 
class of cases—usually those related to a particular constitutional 
right, or a subset thereof. One would then assess the costs of er-
ror—things such as the harm to the individual, the importance of 
the governmental interest likely to be thwarted, the ability of the 
government to achieve its legitimate aims by other means—and 
adopt a decision rule reflecting the relative costs of each kind of er-
ror. Cost-benefit analysis thus offers one explanation for strict 
scrutiny: Judges look more closely at laws that inflict greater 
36 That is, an unconstitutional law can always be repealed, and compensation paid 
(though this is less likely) to those affected by it. “[T]he Constitution presumes that 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). An improvident 
decision might not seem unconstitutional, of course. Indeed, one might think that is 
the very reason that the Court does not strike it down. But if the Constitution con-
tains some utility-maximizing rules—and I will argue it does—then improvident deci-
sions indeed may violate the Constitution. The only question is whether courts should 
enforce these rules, and the modern answer is that they should not. 
37 The analysis might differ depending on whether the act under review is that of the 
federal government or of a state. Professor Thayer argued that erroneously upholding 
state legislation is more costly than erroneously upholding federal legislation, on the 
grounds that the latter expands the authority of a co-ordinate branch, while the for-
mer expands the power of a subordinate state government at the cost of its federal 
superior. Consequently, he urged less deferential review of state laws. Thayer, supra 
note 12, at 154–55. Thus, this form of cost-benefit analysis was at least implicit in the 
literature as far back as 1893. 
38 They also might stay up late at night worrying about the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty, which has always struck me as a little silly. If the Constitution contains judicially 
enforceable restraints on legislative action, which everyone agrees it does, then the 
majority sometimes will not get its way. But if the judicial decision is correct, observa-
tions about the countermajoritarian difficulty are really just complaints about the 
relevant constitutional provision, rather than judicial review. Most invocations of the 
difficulty are probably intended as something else; they are a shorthand expression—
but not an especially helpful one—of doubt that current judicial decisions are correct. 
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harms.39
C. Frequency of Unconstitutional Action 
Strict scrutiny also can be understood as serving quite a different 
purpose, one that relates not so much to the cost of error as to the 
likelihood of a constitutional violation. Some sorts of governmental 
action may be identified by objective factors as highly likely to vio-
late constitutional strictures, and courts are justified in applying 
non-deferential, or even anti-deferential, decision rules to them. 
That is, a court might justifiably overenforce a constitutional op-
erative proposition on the grounds that certain kinds of govern-
mental action may safely be presumed unconstitutional. 
The obvious example comes from equal protection jurispru-
dence. Suppose that the Fourteenth Amendment simply means 
more or less what it says: States cannot treat people differently 
without an adequate justification. Almost all laws classify, and 
many do so with little more justification than rewarding rent-
seeking on the part of various interest groups—something that 
might well be deemed unconstitutional in terms of violating the 
demand that legislators treat citizens with equal concern and re-
spect. The question for courts is how to distinguish the classifica-
tions that require judicial intervention from those that may be left 
to the political process. A court that attempted to police all rent-
seeking legislation would be overwhelmed; perhaps more seriously, 
it would inevitably intrude deeply upon the prerogative of the leg-
islature to make policy choices. Heuristics are needed, and an 
awareness of history can drive the construction of decision rules. 
The knowledge that certain kinds of classification frequently 
have been used for illegitimate reasons, and seldom for legitimate 
ones, would justify overenforcement of equal protection. The 
39 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 438–39 (1997) (describ-
ing cost-benefit and smoking-out understandings of strict scrutiny). The question re-
mains, of course, of why courts are better positioned than legislatures to engage in 
this balancing. A pure cost-benefit answer might be that the cost of allowing an un-
constitutional exercise of power exceeds the cost of striking down a valid one, and 
therefore the use of judicial review as a second screen for unconstitutional laws pro-
vides net benefits. See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1577 (2000) (describing the value of “multiple ve-
toes” to the protection of rights). Alternatively, one of the other factors discussed in 
this Part might be at work. 
ROOSEVELT_BOOK 10/27/2005  6:18 PM 
1664 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1649 
 
greater the ratio of illegitimate uses of a classification to valid ones, 
the more efficient heightened scrutiny becomes. Laws that burden 
the interests of racial minorities are the obvious example. Because 
such laws have been used so frequently for improper purposes, a 
decision rule that strikes down almost all such laws will invalidate 
many unconstitutional laws and very few legitimate ones. For just 
such reasons, the Court has reacted to the history and persistence 
of racial discrimination by strictly scrutinizing such laws.40 Likewise, 
in announcing heightened scrutiny for gender-based classifications 
in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court referred explicitly to the 
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”41
D. Legislative Pathologies 
Another justification for an anti-deferential decision rule arises 
when there is reason to doubt the good faith of the legislature. In a 
well-functioning democracy, the legislature generally can be 
trusted to balance the costs of a law against its benefits and to do 
so more accurately than judges can. In an identifiable range of cir-
cumstances, however, the political process will fall victim to pre-
dictable malfunctions; the legislature’s incentives will not align with 
the public interest. Laws that entrench legislators are the most ob-
vious example. More generally, courts may identify cases in which 
the benefits of a law accrue to a constituency to which the legisla-
ture is responsive while its burdens fall on a group with less voice. 
A law that benefits locals while burdening out-of-staters is the 
paradigm example, but one that benefits a politically powerful 
group while burdening a weaker group presents essentially the 
same problem. In such cases, there is reason to doubt the sound-
ness of legislative decisionmaking. Even if the subject matter of the 
decision falls within the legislative competence, courts may craft 
non-deferential decision rules to deal with situations in which it 
40 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Our 
jurisprudence ranks race a ‘suspect’ category, ‘not because [race] is inevitably an im-
permissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame, 
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.’” (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973) (noting “history of purposeful unequal treatment” as one criterion for suspect 
class status). 
41 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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appears the legislature may be engaged in self-dealing, or in dis-
tributing benefits to its powerful constituents. Deference is inap-
propriate where the legislature cannot offer an unbiased assess-
ment of the situation. 
This sort of justification for non-deferential decision rules is es-
sentially the one championed by Professor John Hart Ely.42 It also 
crops up in Supreme Court jurisprudence, such as the San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez43 criteria for suspect class 
status and in the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products.44 More recently, it has been urged by Judge Guido 
Calabresi and Professor Rebecca Brown.45
E. Enforcement Costs 
Some constitutional operative propositions may require courts 
to decide questions that they simply cannot, or that they cannot 
without burdensome or intrusive evidence-gathering. That gov-
ernmental acts cannot be based on personal hostility is a plausible 
constitutional operative proposition, but plumbing the mind of the 
governmental actor is costly and intrusive at the least, and perhaps 
impossible, especially in the case of multi-member legislative bod-
ies. Thus, a court may substitute a decision rule that turns on objec-
tive and easily ascertainable factors. As Professor Berman writes: 
[W]henever the Court has rejected an invitation to directly in-
quire into a governmental actor’s purposes or reasons for action, 
42 Combating legislative entrenchment is what Professor Ely refers to as “[c]learing 
the [c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of Judicial Review 105 (1980). Giving more searching review to laws that 
benefit the politically powerful at the expense of the powerless is part of what he re-
fers to as “[f]acilitating the [r]epresentation of [m]inorities.” Id. at 135. In this latter 
context, Professor Ely distinguished between “‘first degree’ prejudice,” which leads 
legislatures to discount the interests of powerless or unpopular minorities, and “mis-
apprehension” prejudice, which leads legislatures to err in their assessments of the 
impact or efficacy of laws. Id. at 153, 157. First degree prejudice relates to institutional 
incentives; second degree “misapprehension” prejudice is an issue of institutional 
competence in the narrow sense I have employed it. 
43 411 U.S. at 28. 
44 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
45 Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination 
and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 
Harv. L. Rev. 80, 90–93 (1991); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1497 (2002).  
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there is a chance that the resulting doctrine in fact reflects com-
pound judgments: first, that the true constitutional meaning does 
turn upon the actor’s purposes, and second, that such meaning is 
best administered via a decision rule that conclusively presumes 
the absence (or presence) of such purposes under specified cir-
cumstances.46
Constitutional criminal procedure offers another example. Indi-
gent defendants are entitled to appellate representation roughly 
equivalent to that of those who can afford lawyers. But no one is 
entitled to a frivolous appeal, and thus courts regularly find them-
selves reviewing requests by appointed appellate counsel to with-
draw on the grounds that no arguable issues exist. Here the consti-
tutional requirement is that counsel review the record as an 
advocate in attempting to identify arguable trial errors before seek-
ing to withdraw; the question is what rule will allow courts to de-
termine whether such review has occurred.47 Attempts to do so di-
rectly would prove quite difficult, and the Court has responded by 
adopting rules that are crafted to facilitate detection of violations 
rather than attempting to track constitutional meaning precisely. 
What its decision rule requires of advocates is not the invisible 
process of advocacy-oriented review but a tangible work product 
that requires a review of the record and an assessment of issues—
not quite what the Constitution demands, but something whose ex-
istence a court can easily verify.48
F. Guidance for Other Governmental Actors 
One of the hazards of attempting to model decision rules closely 
on operative propositions is that general principles do not decide 
concrete cases. That is, agreeing that the government may not treat 
people differently without an adequate justification is not agreeing 
on very much. 
The uncertainty created by agreement only on such a high level 
of generality is undesirable for a number of reasons. Divergent 
46 Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 67 (emphasis omitted). 
47 As Justice Souter put it, “[a] judicial process that renders constitutional error in-
visible is, after all, itself an affront to the Constitution.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 
259, 295 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
48 See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Robbins). 
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lower court opinions detract from the uniformity of federal law and 
increase the Supreme Court’s workload. Uncertainty on the part of 
governmental actors may lead either to excessive timidity or to 
wasted resources when a good faith attempt to comply with consti-
tutional demands is later held invalid. For both of these reasons, a 
court may substitute a bright-line decision rule for the more stan-
dard-like operative proposition.49
IV. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS 
The next question is what the use of the model is: What is the 
value of looking at things from this perspective? This Part consid-
ers a broad range of existing doctrine from the decision rules per-
spective. Its breadth comes at some cost in depth. More elaborate 
and sustained analyses of particular constitutional provisions and 
their associated doctrine would certainly be valuable,50 but the pur-
pose of this Part is to demonstrate the methodology of the decision 
rules analysis—the way in which this perspective can illuminate 
doctrine. 
Briefly put, the methodology is to start with the constitutional 
operative proposition and consider its relation to the decision rules 
that the Court has crafted.51 Examining this relation suggests which 
of the factors set out in Part III are at work in a particular line of 
doctrine. Understanding which factors are at work gives us a better 
49 At the same time, of course, the Court may be tempted itself to enforce the opera-
tive proposition rather than the decision rule it has articulated for lower courts. Pro-
fessor Frederick Schauer adverted to this possibility. See Frederick Schauer, The Sec-
ond-Best First Amendment, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 19 (1989). I will suggest that 
we have seen it in a variety of contexts. See infra Section V.B. 
50 Professor Berman already has provided a more narrowly focused investigation of 
the Commerce Clause. See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the 
Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1487 (2004) [hereinafter Ber-
man, Piercing the Surface]. I rely in part on his insights in my discussion of that clause. 
I believe that the decision rules perspective also reveals both what has gone wrong 
with modern substantive due process and how to improve it. Considerations of space 
and focus prevent the inclusion of that analysis here, which must be the subject of 
another article. 
51 The Court does not necessarily work this way. Frequently, modern cases will focus 
entirely on doctrine (which generally speaking comprises decision rules) rather than 
operative propositions. See Amar, supra note 16, at 74–78. I, however, will suggest the 
historical development of doctrine generally follows a similar pattern: Early cases an-
nounce the operative proposition and adopt decision rules that track it closely, while 
later cases mediate its application through progressively more refined decision rules. 
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sense of the source of particular decision rules and thus makes 
them easier to evaluate. Frequently, I will claim, it makes doctrine 
appear more reasonable than standard accounts, and it offers a 
clearer analysis of what motivates particular doctrinal shifts. Addi-
tionally, it lets us see how the doctrine might plausibly evolve in 
the future, and how it might not. 
A. Criminal Procedure 
Criminal procedure offers a neat example of the surprising fact 
that the decision rules model is both a fully accepted part of mod-
ern Supreme Court jurisprudence and, at the same time, subject to 
strategic or inadvertent disregard. Two cases from the same Term 
demonstrate the divergence. 
One of the most hotly anticipated decisions of the Supreme 
Court’s 1999 Term was Dickerson v. United States.52 In response to 
the Court’s 1968 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,53 Congress en-
acted Section 3501, which purported to restore the pre-Miranda 
“totality of the circumstances” test to determine the voluntariness 
and admissibility of confessions in federal court.54 Deemed uncon-
stitutional by most, Section 3501 lay dormant until the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied it, without 
the government’s urging, to uphold admission of an unwarned con-
fession.55
Dickerson seemed to present the Court with a difficult decision. 
The idea that Miranda was constitutionally required seemed im-
plausible on its face: Could the precise wording of the Miranda 
warnings be drawn directly from the Fifth Amendment? (To put 
the matter in the terms used earlier, it is hard to see Miranda as ei-
ther direct enforcement or an attempt at perfect enforcement of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause.) If not, however, the conclusion that 
followed was not simply that Section 3501 was a permissible re-
placement but that Miranda itself should be overruled. If Miranda 
52 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
53 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000). 
55 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). As the United States 
continued to maintain that § 3501 was unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit allowed 
Paul Cassell, a Miranda critic, to share oral argument time for the purpose of defend-
ing its constitutionality. Id. at 680 n.14. 
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was not constitutionally required, how could the Court ever have 
imposed it on the states? 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in fact relied on 
Miranda’s application to state court proceedings to reach the con-
clusion that the decision was “constitutionally based.”56 He did not 
consider the legitimacy of Miranda ab initio; he was willing to ac-
cept its status as precedent without asserting its correctness as an 
original matter. Justice Scalia’s dissent attacked that position force-
fully, arguing that as Miranda was clearly not compelled by the 
Constitution, it could claim constitutional roots only if the Court 
had the ability “not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand 
it, imposing what it regards as useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions 
upon Congress and the States.”57 “That is an immense and frighten-
ing anti-democratic power,” Justice Scalia concluded, “and it does 
not exist.”58
The majority did not respond to Justice Scalia’s argument that 
the Court had no power to adopt prophylactic rules. Why it re-
mained silent is unclear, but the appropriate response, made most 
forcefully by David Strauss, is that such rules are ubiquitous.59 A 
prophylactic rule is simply an overenforcing decision rule, and 
overenforcement is commonplace. Professor Strauss points to the 
content-based/content-neutral distinction in First Amendment 
law,60 and I have argued that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is another example. 
Justice Scalia appears to believe that strict scrutiny is in fact part 
of the meaning of the Constitution—that is, an operative proposi-
tion—because he demands strict scrutiny for affirmative action but 
denies the Court’s ability to adopt prophylactic rules. This is a con-
sistent position, though a surprising one for either a textualist or an 
originalist.61 Moreover, Miranda might seem different, for it does 
not merely adjust the level of deference employed by the Court; it 
56 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440. 
57 Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. 
59 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 
(1998). 
60 Id. at 198–201. 
61 The text of the Equal Protection Clause does not identify any particular classifica-
tions as suspect, and the Reconstruction Congress seemed to find some racial classifi-
cations unproblematic. See infra notes 185–87. 
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prescribes a particular procedure that governmental actors must 
follow. Of course, strict scrutiny itself goes beyond any ordinary 
understanding of nondeferential review. By demanding a compel-
ling state interest and narrow tailoring, it sets out rules nearly as 
specific as Miranda’s, a good deal more constraining, and equally 
difficult to find in the Constitution itself. 
A more telling rebuttal to Justice Scalia’s argument, however, is 
that earlier in the same Term as Dickerson, the Court decided a 
case in which it confronted essentially the same question. In a line 
of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, the Court had held that, 
while the States were not obliged to provide for appellate review of 
criminal convictions, the Constitution placed some constraints on 
the form such review could take if they did so.62 In particular, if ap-
pellate review with assistance of counsel was available to those 
who retained paid lawyers, counsel must be provided for indi-
gents.63 Questions then arose about the duties of appointed counsel 
who concluded that an appeal was frivolous and sought to with-
draw. In Anders v. California, the Court set out a procedure for 
such lawyers to follow. In order to assure that indigent appellants 
were receiving the substantial equality of treatment that the Con-
stitution guaranteed, appointed lawyers seeking to end their repre-
sentation should submit “a brief referring to anything in the record 
that might arguably support the appeal.”64 The requirement that 
the brief be submitted was not part of the duty of advocacy (the 
operative proposition); it was a device by which a court could de-
termine that the duty of advocacy had been fulfilled—that is, it was 
a decision rule. 
In People v. Wende, the California Supreme Court endorsed an 
alternative procedure, whereby an appointed attorney would sim-
ply summarize the factual and procedural history of the case, with-
out identifying any issues she had considered.65 Smith v. Robbins 
presented the question of whether the Wende procedure was ac-
ceptable, or whether Anders had set out the exclusive means of 
62 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). Griffin’s progeny include Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353, 355 (1963), Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741–42 (1967), and Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79–81 (1988). 
63 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58. 
64 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
65 600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Cal. 1979). 
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constitutional compliance.66 Thus, just as Dickerson would, Smith 
asked the Court to determine whether the procedure set out in a 
previous case was constitutionally required (an operative proposi-
tion), or whether it was merely a judicially-crafted device to protect 
an underlying constitutional right (a decision rule), for which an 
equally effective alternative might be substituted.67
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Smith explicitly described 
the Anders procedure as “a prophylactic one” and noted that “the 
States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those pro-
cedures adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to appellate 
counsel.”68 Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s opinion without 
comment, placing him on record as at least implicitly endorsing the 
idea that the Court has the power to overenforce constitutional 
rights.69
Justice Souter’s dissent took issue with Justice Thomas’s assess-
ment of the Wende procedure, but not with the initial proposition 
that the Anders procedure was judicially crafted and nonexclu-
sive.70 Every member of the current Supreme Court, then, is on re-
cord supporting the decision rules perspective. From that perspec-
tive, Dickerson seems to be much ado about nothing. Obviously, 
Miranda created a decision rule. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause bars the introduction of compelled confes-
sions; that is the constitutional operative proposition. But a deci-
sion rule that simply tracked the operative proposition would have 
been undesirable. It would have given little guidance to law en-
66 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000). 
67 For a similar analysis of Smith, see Susan R. Klein, Identifying and 
(Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Consti-
tutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1030, 1042–43 (2001). 
68 Smith, 528 U.S. at 265. 
69 Id. at 263. Interestingly, he seems to have endorsed underenforcement as well, this 
time explicitly. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), a case dealing with the un-
enumerated fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children, 
Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s conclusion that a Washington state law, 
which allowed grandparents to obtain visitation rights upon a showing that visitation 
was in the best interests of the child, violated the Constitution. Id. at 67, 91. Justice 
Scalia argued that unenumerated rights were simply not judicially enforceable, rather 
than that they did not exist. “I do not believe that the power which the Constitution 
confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) 
infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.” Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
70 Smith, 528 U.S. at 292, 297 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
ROOSEVELT_BOOK 10/27/2005  6:18 PM 
1672 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1649 
 
forcement officials, who would be left uncertain about how far they 
could go in eliciting statements from suspects. Likewise, develop-
ment on a case-by-case basis would have taken a long time and a 
substantial investment of Supreme Court resources to produce a 
uniform and consistent body of law. Lastly, the voluntariness de-
termination was difficult for courts to make on the basis of a paper 
record that might reveal very little about the actual tone and tenor 
of an interrogation. 
For all these reasons, a different decision rule was desirable, and 
Miranda provided one. The question Dickerson presented was the 
extent to which Congress could override the Court’s decision rules. 
The answer is that judicially-crafted decision rules should not nec-
essarily be understood as exclusive, and equally effective alterna-
tives for enforcing the operative proposition may be acceptable. In 
Smith, the Court had said just that. The problem in Dickerson was 
that Congress had offered not an equally effective alternative, but 
rather one that simply erased the Court’s rule and thereby reintro-
duced the problems that had necessitated Miranda in the first 
place. That was clearly an insufficient substitute, and rejection was 
the appropriate reaction. 
What is significant about Dickerson from the perspective of the 
broader aims of this Article is the fact that the Court failed to give 
the easy answer to Justice Scalia’s attack. While every Justice in 
Smith appeared to understand that Supreme Court doctrine may 
depart substantially from the operative propositions of the Consti-
tution, this understanding was not brought up when the practice 
was challenged. What this suggests is that while the Justices have 
internalized the decision rules model to some degree, they do not 
necessarily accept it on a conscious level. In other cases, where the 
issue has been explicitly debated, one finds only a minority endors-
ing the decision rules perspective.71
71 In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, for instance, a major-
ity of the Justices appeared to endorse Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that judi-
cial pronouncements necessarily track (and establish) the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Indeed, the analysis in Garrett goes further. It identifies 
the Constitution rather explicitly with what the Court does, down to its allocation of 
the burden of proof, rather than with what the Court says. Justice Breyer, writing for 
the four dissenting Justices, protested that the Court was mistaking its decision rules 
for operative propositions. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra notes 204–12 
and accompanying text. 
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B. The Commerce Clause 
If the Commerce Clause means what it says—and if we consider 
the clause in isolation—the operative proposition might seem fairly 
easy to derive from the text: Congress has the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce, and nothing else. From this perspective, a court 
reviewing the exercise of the commerce power might well choose a 
decision rule that tracks the operative proposition fairly closely. 
The question would be simply whether the activity Congress has 
attempted to regulate is commerce, or something else. That ques-
tion is one of categorization, a type of question that usually falls 
within the judicial competence, and we might thus expect that 
courts would answer it with little or no deference to legislative 
judgment. The decision rule suggested by this analysis was em-
ployed in the early twentieth-century cases: Uphold the law if Con-
gress seeks to regulate commerce and strike it down if Congress 
seeks to regulate something else, such as manufacture or labor 
practices.72
Things are not quite that simple, however, for the Constitution 
also gives Congress the power to pass all laws “necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated powers. Adding 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to the analysis complicates the 
construction of the operative proposition. Assuming a fairly 
straightforward textualism, the question then becomes: If Congress 
has sought to regulate something other than commerce, is the regu-
lation a necessary and proper means to the regulation of com-
merce? 
Answering this question requires us to settle the meaning of 
“necessary and proper,” a task that divided the Framers in their 
consideration of the First Bank of the United States.73 In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall famously an-
nounced that “necessary” “frequently imports no more than that 
72 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269, 271–74 (1918) (striking down 
regulation of interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor as an impermissi-
ble attempt to regulate manufacture). 
73 See Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 11–13 (4th ed. 
2000) (describing Jefferson’s and Randolph’s responses to the bank controversy); id. 
at 13–16 (quoting Hamilton’s argument); James Madison, Speech in Congress Oppos-
ing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in James Madison: Writings 480, 484 (Jack N. 
Rakove ed., 1999) (describing Madison’s position against the Bank). 
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one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another.”74
The operative proposition according to McCulloch is that Con-
gress has the power to regulate interstate commerce—and also to 
pass legislation useful or convenient to such regulation—if the leg-
islative intent is in fact to regulate commerce.75 The relation be-
tween this proposition and the substantial effects test on which the 
doctrine settled in the late 1930s is not hard to see: If an activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, then its regulation might 
well be necessary (in even the strongest sense) to the regulation of 
commerce. The substantial effects test, then, seems a relatively 
straightforward translation of the operative proposition into doc-
trine. To this extent, it could be argued that the New Deal Court, 
in loosening the strictures on Congress’s commerce power, was 
simply rediscovering the Necessary and Proper Clause. In NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court consciously echoed the 
clause, holding that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate 
activities “if they have such a close and substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”76
Settling on substantial effects as a doctrinal rule had further con-
sequences. McCulloch had gone on to note that the degree of ne-
cessity was a question for the legislature, thereby suggesting that 
some deference was appropriate.77 Translating necessity into sub-
74 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819). See generally Randy Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183 (2003). 
75 McCulloch had suggested that an improper motive might invalidate otherwise 
constitutionally sound legislation: “[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing 
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the govern-
ment; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act was 
not the law of the land.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. One might think that this restric-
tion was limited to legislation resting on the Necessary and Proper Clause, via the 
principle that pretextual legislation is not “proper.” In Hammer, the Court extended 
it even to direct regulation of commerce, disapproving of a ban on interstate shipment 
of goods manufactured using child labor on the grounds that “[t]he act in its effect 
does not regulate transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at 
which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.” 247 
U.S. at 271–72.
76 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
77 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (stating that for the Court “to inquire into the degree of 
its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, 
and to tread on legislative ground”). The factor on which Chief Justice Marshall re-
lied here is institutional competence, based on the nineteenth-century understanding 
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stantial effects made the suggestion emphatic. Whether a given ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce is no longer a cate-
gorical question within the judicial competence. It is an empirical 
one, and as the Court has recognized, it is the sort that Congress 
may be better able to answer. In the absence of any particular rea-
son to suspect that Congress is not answering the question in good 
faith, superior legislative competence suggests deference. In 
Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court explained that its review de-
manded only “a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory 
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.”78
For similar institutional reasons, the New Deal Court abandoned 
the inquiry into motive. In Sonzinsky v. United States, the Court re-
fused to consider whether a tax on firearm dealers had been en-
acted for a regulatory purpose, stating that “[i]nquiry into the hid-
den motives which may move Congress to exercise a power 
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of 
courts.”79
The decision rules perspective thus gives us the following story 
of the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence up to ap-
proximately 1995: After some initial attempts to enforce the opera-
tive proposition directly, the Court adopted a decision rule (the 
substantial effects test) that granted Congress the considerable lati-
tude McCulloch had promised. Because the Court had settled on a 
factual issue as dispositive, it was led to defer even further, reason-
ing that its test fell within the competency of the legislature. This 
deference seemed to take the Court out of the business of evaluat-
ing Commerce Clause legislation entirely.80 This progression—early 
of judging as categorization: Categorical issues are for the courts; questions of degree 
are for the legislature. See William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal 
Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 4–7 (1998). 
78 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
79 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937). As the reference to the competency of courts makes 
clear, Sonzinsky did not assert that motive was irrelevant, making it consistent with 
the pretext passage from McCulloch. Quite swiftly, however, the decision rule that 
courts would not inquire into subjective motive came to be understood as an opera-
tive proposition that motive was irrelevant. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
115 (1941) (“The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are mat-
ters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no 
restriction and over which the courts are given no control.”). 
80 In response, Judge Kozinski suggested that the Commerce Clause could more 
properly be called the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause.” Alex Kozin-
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attempts to hew close to the operative proposition, explicit consid-
eration of one or more of the relevant factors, and adoption of a 
decision rule notably distinct from the operative proposition—is 
the classic course of doctrinal evolution, and we shall encounter it 
more than once in the following Sections. 
In 1995, however, things changed, as the Court demanded judi-
cially-enforceable limits and began constructing them.81 I postpone 
discussion of these cases, for they are not part of the classic pro-
gression. Instead, they illustrate what I will argue is the characteris-
tic mistake that occurs when the Court begins to treat its decision 
rules as though they were operative propositions. 
C. Equal Protection 
The story of equal protection jurisprudence is in some ways simi-
lar to that of the Commerce Clause. I have suggested that a plausi-
ble statement of the constitutional operative proposition underly-
ing the Equal Protection Clause is simply that the government 
must have some legitimate justification for treating some people 
worse than others.82 The question then is how to translate this op-
erative proposition into decision rules. 
The Court’s early decisions characteristically hewed close to the 
underlying constitutional proposition: They announced a prohibi-
tion on invidious discrimination and applied it on a case-by-case 
basis. In Strauder v. West Virginia,83 for instance, the Court de-
scribed the evils at which the Equal Protection Clause was aimed 
as, variously, discrimination motivated by “jealousy and positive 
dislike,”84 “unfriendly action,”85 or discrimination “implying inferi-
ski, Introduction, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 5 (1995). The quip reflects a funda-
mental misunderstanding, a conflation of decision rules and operative propositions. 
While the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence did suggest that Congress could do 
whatever it wanted as a practical matter (that is, the Court would not restrain it), it 
did not suggest this as a constitutional matter. The Court simply gave Congress pri-
mary responsibility for observing constitutional limits. 
81 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
82 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
83 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
84 Id. at 306. 
85 Id. 
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ority in civil society.”86 Applying these standards, Strauder found 
that exclusion of blacks from jury service was “practically a brand 
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority,”87 
and therefore unconstitutional. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court 
struck down an ordinance that, though facially neutral, was applied 
“with an evil eye and an unequal hand,” embodying “hostility to 
the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong.”88 But 
such a rule offers little guidance to lower courts and governmental 
actors, and its administration consumes substantial judicial re-
sources. Thus, over time, the Court developed decision rules that 
allowed for a more cost-effective and consistent enforcement of the 
operative proposition. 
These are the tiers of scrutiny, and the cases introducing them 
make clear that they are offered as shortcuts to the detection of in-
vidious discrimination. Skinner v. Oklahoma, the first case to use 
the phrase “strict scrutiny” in the equal protection context, ex-
plained explicitly that “strict scrutiny of the classification which a 
State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or 
otherwise, invidious discriminations are made.”89
The question then becomes, when should the anti-deferential 
rule of strict scrutiny be employed? It is at this point that the fac-
tors enter the picture. Start with the operative proposition that the 
government may not treat some people worse than others without 
a legitimate reason. Animus is an obviously illegitimate reason, and 
86 Id. at 308. 
87 Id. 
88 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). Other early cases specifically invoking invidiousness 
include Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1885) (upholding legislation after finding 
“no invidious discrimination”) and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (finding a 
constitutional violation because “[d]elegates of the State’s power have discharged 
their official functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citi-
zens and black”). Even after the Court began to develop the tiers of scrutiny, it con-
tinued to refer to invidiousness as the operative proposition. See Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of 
whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious 
discrimination.”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) (finding factual ba-
sis for congressional judgment that a state literacy requirement “constituted an in-
vidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Statutes create many classifications which do not 
deny equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitu-
tion.”).
89 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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detection and suppression of animus must therefore be a central 
concern of the decision rules. 
A legitimate reason might be that the benefits the classification 
offers society as a whole exceed the burdens imposed on the disfa-
vored group. Assessment of benefits and burdens ordinarily falls 
within legislative competence, so anti-deferential review of classifi-
cations not bearing the marks of animus must therefore rely on 
some reason to doubt the legislature’s good faith or ability. Inade-
quately justified classifications might fall into several categories: 
first, those that impose excessive burdens on the interests of one 
group because the legislature is, though not hostile, indifferent to 
their welfare; second, those that impose excessive burdens on a 
group because the legislature does not understand their interests or 
holds factually false beliefs about them; and third, those that are 
cost-justified individually but repeatedly burden the same group 
because that group lacks the political power to win benefits 
through the legislative process.90
The indicia of suspect classifications that the Court has an-
nounced track these concerns quite well. Classifications are sus-
pect, the Court has stated, if they have historically been used for 
improper purposes and show little potential for legitimate use.91 
They are suspect if they burden groups that are the targets of dis-
crimination or that are denied access to the political process.92 And 
they are suspect if they embody attitudes that society, or Congress, 
has deemed illegitimate.93
Heightened scrutiny, in short, is a method of allocating judicial 
scrutiny to those classifications most likely to be invidious.94 It does 
90 See generally Ely, supra note 42, at 152–61. 
91 Certain characteristics “are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legiti-
mate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
440 (1985); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (justifying 
heightened scrutiny for gender classifications by reference to a “long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination”). 
92 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
93 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687–88 (noting Congress’s conclusion “that classifications 
based upon sex are inherently invidious”). 
94 As Ely put it, “the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of un-
covering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake—to treat a group worse 
not in the service of some overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply dis-
advantaging its members.” Ely, supra note 42, at 153. 
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not reflect a judgment that these classifications inherently inflict 
great harm on those classified. That is, its justification is not that 
suspect classifications are high-cost laws.95 In Professor Jed 
Rubenfeld’s phrasing, heightened scrutiny in the equal protection 
context is more about smoking-out than about balancing.96
As is generally the case, the decision rules that the Court has 
chosen will produce results that differ from those the Constitution 
prescribes. Rational basis review underprotects the operative 
proposition. It is easy to imagine a non-suspect governmental clas-
sification that is in fact based on hostility towards its target but that 
nonetheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate inter-
est. Such a law will survive rational basis review, though it is a 
quintessential example of invidious discrimination.97
Likewise, strict scrutiny overprotects. It is only somewhat harder 
to imagine laws that classify according to race in order to serve le-
gitimate governmental interests. (It is very easy if we include 
within the suspect category classifications that benefit members of 
a racial minority.) These laws may not be invidious, but they will 
be struck down nonetheless. Strict scrutiny for racial classifications 
essentially embodies a rule that race may not be used as a proxy, 
which reflects the judgment that the aim of racial classifications is 
frequently illegitimate, and, if legitimate, can likely be served by 
drawing a different line. 
This analysis of the factors driving the creation of decision rules 
does not, of course, fit perfectly with current doctrine. It suggests a 
somewhat different treatment of so-called benign discrimination: 
laws that benefit, rather than burden, a minority or politically weak 
group.98 It also suggests that heightened scrutiny is probably appro-
priate for laws that have a disparate impact on politically weak 
groups, an approach the Court rejected in Washington v. Davis.99 
95 The notable exception here is heightened scrutiny for discrimination with respect 
to fundamental rights, which is probably best understood as anti-deferential review of 
high-cost classifications. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (ap-
plying heightened scrutiny to state law interfering with the right to marry). 
96 See Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 438. 
97 Cf. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (noting that 
the presence of “negative attitudes” alone does not create a constitutional violation 
under the rational basis test). 
98 See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
99 426 U.S. 229, 239, 242 (1976). 
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Such laws may well be attempts to target disfavored groups by a 
legislature aware that overt classifications will be strictly reviewed. 
But even if not, a law whose burdens fall disproportionately on a 
politically weak group presents a clear example of a situation in 
which the legislature’s assessment of benefits and burdens is not to 
be trusted. Such laws might well be passed even though their bur-
dens exceed their benefits, and judges seeking to ensure that some 
individuals are not treated worse than others without adequate jus-
tification should examine them closely. 
This account of equal protection is novel in its methodology and 
focus. I do not believe that anyone else has made a similar attempt 
to trace the evolution of the decision rules as progressively refined 
implementations of a constant operative proposition. Its conclu-
sion, however, is quite familiar. That the tiers of scrutiny are not 
operative propositions but decision rules is well known.100 In the 
1980s, however, the Court’s jurisprudence in this area began to 
shift. Those developments are of a piece with the modern Com-
merce Clause cases and are discussed below in Part VI. 
D. Congressional Enforcement Powers 
One way of highlighting the distinction between constitutional 
operative propositions and decision rules is to consider the ques-
tion from the perspective of a non-judicial actor. Conscientious leg-
islators, I have suggested, should consider themselves bound by the 
operative propositions rather than the decision rules. If the deci-
sion rules underenforce the operative propositions, a legislator 
should nonetheless attempt to comply with the more stringent op-
erative proposition. (This was one of the main contentions of Pro-
fessor Larry Sager’s Fair Measure.101) If the decision rule overen-
forces, the matter is less clear; the legislature may propose 
alternatives (as it did in Dickerson and Robbins), but from a prac-
tical perspective it is likely to find itself unable to take some ac-
100 One of the earliest and most penetrating statements of this point was made by 
Professor Owen Fiss. Fiss, supra note 19. Professor John Hart Ely’s analysis was much 
the same. See Ely, supra note 42, at 145–46 (describing heightened scrutiny as a way 
of “‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation”). For a more recent example, see Suz-
anne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 493 (2004) 
(“[S]uspect classification was first adopted as an analytic device . . . .”). 
101 Sager, supra note 19, at 1264. 
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tions that are in fact constitutional. That is the cost of overen-
forcement. 
Generally speaking, then, underenforcing rules give non-judicial 
actors greater latitude (which they should in good conscience de-
cline), and overenforcing rules give them lesser (which they must 
grudgingly accept). In the case of congressional enforcement pow-
ers, however, the relationship may be reversed. Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power “to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the other provisions of the Amendment, 
notably the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. To be ap-
propriate, enforcement legislation must be reasonably designed to 
prevent or remedy violations of the other provisions. That is the 
operative proposition. 
In crafting decision rules to implement this proposition, the 
Court faced two questions. The first was simply what level of def-
erence should be employed, the familiar choice between rational 
basis review and various forms of heightened scrutiny. Given no 
particular reason to distrust Congress, the Court settled on rational 
basis.102 The second, which arises less frequently, was whether con-
gressional legislation should be measured against the operative 
propositions underlying the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses or against the decision rules the Court had selected for 
those clauses. 
In its early cases, the Court fairly clearly chose the former alter-
native. In reviewing congressional determinations that a given 
practice violated the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, the 
Court asked explicitly whether Congress might rationally have 
found the practice to constitute invidious discrimination—which is, 
I have suggested, what the constitutional operative proposition 
prohibits.103 Moreover, the Court suggested, Congress was free to 
use its own institutional competency in making the determination. 
The Court generally eschews a pretext analysis that inquires into 
102 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (“It is not for us to review the 
congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a 
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”). 
103 See id. at 656 (“[I]t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might 
predicate a judgment that the application of New York’s English literacy requirement 
to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican 
schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted an in-
vidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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the subjective intent of legislatures, but it indicated that Congress 
might consider such a factor.104 It even went so far as to suggest that 
Congress could second-guess a state legislature’s balancing of in-
terests—something the Court does only in highly unusual circum-
stances—and find an equal protection violation if the balance 
struck appeared to slight the interests of some group.105
In short, the post-New Deal Section Five cases adopt the princi-
ple that when Congress is determining whether a constitutional 
violation exists or is threatened—the predicate for legitimate exer-
cises of the Section Five enforcement power—it is entitled to ask 
whether States have complied with the constitutional operative 
propositions of Section One, not with the Court’s decision rules. 
Those decision rules, as Justice Brennan explained in Oregon v. 
Mitchell, are created by consideration of factors including the insti-
tutional competence of the judiciary, and Congress is not bound to 
observe them.106
From this perspective, the prospect that Congress might prohibit 
state practices that would be upheld if challenged in court is un-
problematic—not because the prohibition is a means to remedy 
some other “real” violation,107 but because Congress might well be 
correct in deciding that particular instances of discrimination are 
invidious and hence unconstitutional even if the Court’s decision 
rules would uphold them. That is, Congress can legislate to enforce 
104 See id. at 654 (“Congress might well have questioned . . . whether [the reasons the 
state asserted] were actually the interests being served.”). 
105 See id. at 653 (“It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of 
the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state in-
terests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch 
that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considera-
tions . . . .”).
106 400 U.S. 112, 246–48 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part) (“But there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be 
compelled to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as 
our decisions have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial 
power under the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional 
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
107 Of course, the Court also recognized that prohibition of some constitutionally 
permissible conduct might be an appropriate means to deter or remedy violations. In 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for example, a history of judicially-recognized viola-
tions of Fifteenth Amendment rights existed, and the Court allowed a blanket ban on 
literacy tests, even though such tests did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment unless 
employed in a discriminatory fashion. 383 U.S. 301, 327, 333–34 (1966). 
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the full scope of Section One even if the relevant judicial doctrine 
underenforces it. 
This is not, it should be clear, the same thing as asserting that 
Congress should have some power to determine the meaning, or 
operative proposition, of Section One.108 It is simply the recognition 
that the Court has, for various reasons, decided to underenforce 
the operative proposition in certain contexts. Because those rea-
sons relate to institutional factors such as fact-finding competence 
and electoral accountability, Congress, which has different institu-
tional capacities, need not follow the underenforcing rules. As Pro-
fessor Sager puts it, “congressional attempts pursuant to [S]ection 
[Five] to enlarge upon the judiciary’s limited construct do no vio-
lence to the general notion that the federal judiciary’s readings of 
the Constitution are dispositive within our system.”109
Once again, this understanding did not persist. Again, the Court 
began to mistake its decision rules for operative propositions. 
Those modern cases (roughly, those following City of Boerne v. 
Flores110) are discussed in Part VI. 
E. The Free Exercise Clause 
The development of free exercise jurisprudence is well known. I 
believe that the decision rules perspective offers additional insights 
into the sources and significance of the Court’s different ap-
proaches. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court seemed to have settled 
on a particular decision rule: Laws that significantly burdened the 
108 Indeed, it was the Morgan Court that decided Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), 
the canonical statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. Cooper 
admittedly asserts supremacy vis-à-vis the states, but it does suggest that the Court 
was not inclined to grant nonjudicial actors an independent power of constitutional 
interpretation. Id. at 4. 
109 Sager, supra note 19, at 1239; see also Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 
59 (noting that courts should “assess the fit between challenged legislation and the 
constitutional operative proposition, not between the statute and the decision rule”). 
Conversely, a point Professors Sager and Berman do not make, Congress should not 
be allowed to prohibit some practices that courts would strike down when applying an 
overenforcing decision rule such as strict scrutiny. Thus, for instance, I would main-
tain that even if courts continue to strike down some forms of affirmative action (as it 
appears they will), Congress could not create a liquidated damages remedy for the 
“victims” of such discrimination or impose a criminal sanction on its perpetrators in 
the exercise of its enforcement powers. 
110 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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free exercise of religion would be subject to strict scrutiny and up-
held only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.111 Adoption of strict scrutiny, however, does not signal 
agreement on the operative proposition. Justices who believed in 
different operative propositions might believe that strict scrutiny 
was justified for different reasons. 
In particular, as explained previously, strict scrutiny may be un-
derstood (and has been employed) to serve two quite different 
functions. One is smoking out: the detection of illegitimate mo-
tives, notably of a desire to target particular groups or activities.112 
On this view, the operative proposition forbids governmental at-
tempts to suppress religious activity or belief. The factor support-
ing strict scrutiny is a distrust of the government, a belief that at-
tempts to suppress religion might be camouflaged by innocent 
explanations. Smoking-out strict scrutiny overprotects. Because it 
is so intent on catching pretextual legislation, it will strike down 
some laws that are in fact perfectly innocent. 
The second role of strict scrutiny is balancing: ensuring that the 
government has not intruded on highly important interests need-
lessly or without adequate justification. Strict scrutiny as balancing 
does not necessarily overprotect. If the operative proposition is 
that religious exercise must be specially regarded, application of 
strict scrutiny may track that proposition quite neatly. 
Strict scrutiny for laws burdening free exercise could be under-
stood in either of these ways. The history of religious conflict and 
persecution might suggest that illicit motives are frequent, and that 
overprotection in the name of smoking-out was needed, even if the 
operative proposition protects only freedom from the targeting of 
religious exercise. Likewise, a belief that religious exercise is a pre-
ferred activity would support strict scrutiny as balancing.113
111 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963). 
112 This, I have argued, is the origin of strict scrutiny in the equal protection context. 
See supra Section IV.C.  
113 I have suggested that strict scrutiny as balancing is hard to justify without some 
reason to suspect legislative motive or competence, since legislatures are typically 
considered better than courts at balancing costs and benefits. In the free exercise area, 
however, it is easy to imagine that a legislature would be relatively insensitive to the 
costs imposed on minority expressions of religious belief, which provides a reason to 
abandon the usual deference. For instance, a legislature considering a ban on wine 
would likely take into account its sacramental role in the exercise of the Christian re-
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It might have been the case, then, that the Justices supporting 
Sherbert’s adoption of strict scrutiny held different beliefs about 
the underlying operative proposition. Even if not, however, it was 
possible for subsequent Justices to interpret Sherbert in different 
ways and advocate or resist changes in the decision rule accord-
ingly. 
This is what happened in Employment Division v. Smith.114 There 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, announced that the free exer-
cise right was really a right against targeting. Sherbert’s strict scru-
tiny had been toothless; when the Court “purported to apply” the 
test to contexts other than unemployment benefits, it “always 
found the test satisfied.”115 The persistence of results inconsistent 
with the normal outcome of strict scrutiny suggested that the Court 
had been engaged in smoking-out and was unable to resist the 
temptation to uphold laws that it found innocent, even if conven-
tional application of strict scrutiny would have condemned them. 
This frequent need to resort to what I will call subterfuge—getting 
a particular case “right” according to the operative proposition 
while purporting to apply a decision rule directing a contrary re-
sult—suggested that the overprotection of smoking-out strict scru-
tiny was unnecessary. In consequence, Justice Scalia announced, 
free exercise claims would henceforth be governed by an anti-
targeting rule applied with conventional deference to the legisla-
ture: “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the ob-
ject . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.”116
Other Justices understood Sherbert’s strict scrutiny as balancing 
and Smith’s neutrality rule as consequently underprotecting the 
fundamental right to free exercise. They thus objected that “[t]he 
First Amendment . . . does not distinguish between laws that are 
generally applicable and laws that target particular religious prac-
tices,” but demands a compelling governmental interest to out-
ligion. A legislature considering a ban on peyote might be less attuned to the costs 
imposed on the minority that uses peyote in religious ritual. 
114 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
115 Id. at 883. 
116 Id. at 878. 
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weigh religious liberty in either case.117
The value of the decision rules perspective here is that it offers a 
clear view of what drives the dispute between the Justices in Smith. 
Foregrounding the question of whether Sherbert’s strict scrutiny 
was a smoking-out overprotection of an anti-targeting rule, or a 
balancing analysis reviewing high-cost governmental action, reveals 
conceptual stakes that will be important in other doctrinal areas as 
well. In particular, we shall see, this perspective offers a clearer 
understanding of congressional enforcement power in the recent 
Section Five cases, starting with City of Boerne v. Flores.118
V. THE MINOR PROBLEMS 
I have argued thus far that the decision rules perspective helps 
resolve doctrinal problems. Distinguishing between operative 
propositions and decision rules and paying attention to the factors 
that drive the creation of a particular decision rule suggest some 
ways in which doctrine might be tailored to better track the under-
lying operative propositions. 
With these virtues come new difficulties. A court aware that it is 
creating decision rules will encounter some minor problems. The 
Supreme Court has faced these and generally succeeded in sur-
mounting them. A court that forgets it is creating decision rules 
will face a larger problem. The Supreme Court has encountered 
this one, too, and, especially in recent years, it has handled the 
problem poorly. This Part examines what I call the minor prob-
lems; the next considers the major problem of calcification. 
A. Loss of Fit 
Times change, and with them society and social understandings. 
Approaches that once appeared feasible and coherent may come to 
seem neither; practices that once seemed natural may start striking 
people as ideologically freighted, and later obviously invidious. For 
all of these reasons, decision rules that made sense when adopted 
117 Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 895 (asserting 
“that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, 
and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or 
indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests”).
118 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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may lose their fit. In such cases, the Court will find it necessary to 
change the decision rules. It has done so repeatedly. Here I con-
sider for illustrative purposes two examples drawn from equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. 
1. Sex Discrimination 
The story of sex discrimination jurisprudence is one of decision 
rules adapted to fit new societal understandings. At one point, le-
gal distinctions between men and women were seen as a legitimate, 
if not inevitable, reflection of the nature of things. Of course, they 
were not seen that way by everyone, but the understanding that 
men and women were fundamentally different was sufficiently 
widespread that it could be counted as sufficient justification for 
laws that confined women to the domestic sphere. Some time later, 
due in large part to efforts of those who saw things differently, this 
understanding came to seem ideologically freighted, and, later still, 
illegitimate.119
In Bradwell v. Illinois, four years after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion 
of women from the practice of law.120 Justice Bradley, concurring, 
observed that “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occu-
pations of civil life,” and further stated that “[t]he paramount des-
tiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”121 In 
1948, the Court observed that a state “could, beyond question, for-
bid all women from working behind a bar.”122 The Court acknowl-
edged that the view of women’s appropriate role embodied in such 
a law was contested, but it explicitly rejected the idea that changing 
understandings about women’s appropriate role could affect con-
stitutional decisions: “The Constitution does not require legisla-
tures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any 
more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific 
119 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and The-
ory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 410–13 (1995) (discussing contestability and legitimacy). 
120 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
121 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
122 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948). 
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standards.”123
But attitudes that were merely contestable in 1948 seemed ille-
gitimate by 1973. As a result of the changed understanding, the 
Court’s decision rules lost their fit with the underlying operative 
proposition—discrimination against women had shifted from natu-
ral to invidious. In response, the Court changed its decision rules; 
in Frontiero v. Richardson, relying in part on the expressed judg-
ment of Congress, the Court ratcheted up its level of scrutiny.124 As 
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel put it, “a social movement 
seeking equal citizenship for women prompted sustained constitu-
tional lawmaking by Congress in the early 1970s, which in turn in-
fluenced the development of the Court’s own sex discrimination ju-
risprudence.”125
2. Sexual Orientation 
Something similar is occurring with sexual orientation. In two 
high-profile cases, the Court struck down laws discriminating 
against gays and lesbians.126 But it did not do so by announcing a 
higher level of scrutiny for such laws. Instead, purporting to adhere 
to the rational basis test, the Court found that neither a state con-
stitutional amendment prohibiting local antidiscrimination ordi-
nances from including sexual orientation as a protected category, 
nor a criminal prohibition of same-sex sodomy, was rationally con-
123 Id. at 466. 
124 411 U.S. 677, 687–88. Frontiero cites Justice Brennan’s opinion in Mitchell and his 
opinion for the Court in Morgan, affirming its understanding that Congress might find 
invidious things the Court would not necessarily strike down. Id. at 688 (citing Oregon 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240, 248–49 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Mar-
shall, JJ.) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1966)).  
125 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 
1943, 1950–51 (2003). Professors Post and Siegel further observe that this “legisla-
tive . . . constitutionalism . . . connects constitutional law to the changing constitu-
tional understandings of the American people.” Id. at 1951; see also Jack M. Balkin & 
Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisub-
ordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 26 (2003) (“Courts once ruled that sexual har-
assment did not amount to discrimination on the basis of sex . . . [but] [a]fter social 
movement protest and litigation, courts came to view harassing conduct of this sort as 
sex-based discrimination.”); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 30–40 (2000) (describing equal-
ity norms as rooted in evolving social practices). 
126 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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nected to a legitimate state interest. 
Again, what has happened here is that the old decision rule—
rationality review of laws discriminating on the basis of sexual ori-
entation—has lost fit. The Court has come to believe that such laws 
are not a legitimate expression of moral disapproval but rather in-
vidious discrimination. It is too soon to tell whether application of 
heightened scrutiny to this new class is at the end of this path. The 
current Court seems hesitant to announce new “suspect classes”—
perhaps because it believes that doing so amounts to changing the 
Constitution, and hence is of questionable legitimacy at best. Fail-
ing to change the decision rule, however, leaves the Court in an 
uncomfortable position. If it adheres to the view that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation is frequently invidious, it will 
likely continue to strike down such discrimination while nominally 
applying the rational basis test, producing opinions that are confus-
ing to lower courts and commentators alike.127 I refer to this prac-
tice as subterfuge; I now turn to the challenge it presents for courts. 
B. Subterfuge 
One of the notable characteristics of decision rules, as I have de-
scribed them, is that they get cases wrong. They direct courts to 
strike down laws that are constitutionally sound and to uphold laws 
that are unconstitutional. They may do so in the hopes of minimiz-
ing aggregate errors over time, or they may do so for other reasons, 
but they will at times produce results that strike judges as palpably 
incorrect.128 A lower court judge in such cases has few options; she 
is bound to apply the doctrine the Supreme Court has given her. 
The Supreme Court, however, has no one to reverse it for misap-
plying doctrine, and few, if any, effectual critics. The Court there-
127 In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor suggested that “[w]hen a law exhibits . . . a desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of ra-
tional basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.” 539 
U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This is perhaps an apt description of some of 
the subterfuge cases, but it is not recognizable doctrine. It mingles the operative 
proposition (a prohibition on invidious discrimination) with the decision rule (rational 
basis) in a way that provides very little guidance for lower courts. It does, however, 
reveal the extent to which Justice O’Connor’s analysis is driven by a desire to enforce 
the operative proposition rather than the decision rule. 
128 Suzanne Goldberg points out some of these problems and suggests abandoning 
the tiers of scrutiny entirely. Suzanne B. Goldberg, supra note 100. 
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fore may succumb to the temptation to get a particular case right 
according to the relevant operative proposition, rather than faith-
fully applying the decision rule it has announced.129
Sometimes the practice is simply a harbinger of changes to the 
decision rules. As discussed in Section IV.E, strict scrutiny (an-
nounced in Sherbert v. Verner) of laws burdening the free exercise 
of religion was surprisingly mild. This foreshadowed the milder 
new decision rule announced in Employment Division v. Smith—a 
move from an overprotective rule to a rule more closely tracking 
the operative proposition, or from a balancing rule to an underpro-
tective rule, depending on whom you ask. Likewise, the unusually 
forceful rational basis review of Reed v. Reed130 prophesied the 
heightened scrutiny adopted in Frontiero. 
Sometimes, however, the decision rule does not change. In City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for instance, the Court 
struck down a law discriminating on the basis of mental disability, 
while at the same time reiterating that mental disability categoriza-
tions warranted no more than rational basis review.131 In its sexual 
orientation cases, the Court has continued to adhere to the rational 
basis test,132 and in its recent holding that the University of Michi-
gan Law School’s affirmative action program does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, it claimed to be applying strict scrutiny.133 
And in Pierce County v. Guillen,134 discussed in Section VI.A.1 be-
low, the Court announced continued adherence to the Commerce 
129 The unusual frequency with which statements of the operative proposition occur 
in the cases I identify as subterfuge suggests that the Court at least is partially aware 
that it is enforcing the operative proposition, and not the appropriate decision rule. 
See supra note 127 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s Lawrence concurrence ). 
130 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that statute giving preference to males over 
females in estate administration violates Equal Protection Clause). 
131 473 U.S. 432, 442–44, 450 (1985). 
132 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 
(1996). 
133 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). I believe the result in Grutter was 
certainly right, but the dissenters make a persuasive case that the Court’s “strict scru-
tiny” is of the watered-down variety. See id. at 379–80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 
see also Balkin & Siegel, supra note 125, at 25 (“[I]nconsistency in the decision rules 
used to implement the anticlassification principle arises as courts endeavor to apply 
the anticlassification principle in a manner that constrains practices that seem to 
judges to inflict racial injustice, while enabling practices that seem to judges innocent 
of discriminatory animus and that serve other important social ends.”). 
134 537 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2003). 
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Clause analysis set out in United States v. Morrison and United 
States v. Lopez, though as Professor Mitchell Berman has shown, 
those tests would more plausibly produce the opposite result.135
Subterfuge has some undesirable consequences. It is confusing 
to lower court judges, who must puzzle out how to follow a Court 
whose words diverge from its practice.136 It is a bounty to academ-
ics, who seize the opportunity to explain, but their efforts may not 
prove particularly helpful—indeed, noting the inconsistency be-
tween words and deeds may be the best a commentator can do.137 
Since a court engaged in subterfuge refuses to explain why it 
reaches a result at variance with its stated approach, others must 
speculate, and speculation does not justify a lower court’s attempt 
to follow the Supreme Court’s unstated rationale. 
Indeed, the desire not to authorize lower courts to apply the rule 
the Court refuses to announce is probably one of the more signifi-
cant causes of subterfuge. It is not an adequate justification, how-
ever, and it makes the Court appear arrogant, unprincipled, or 
both. It suggests a lack of faith in either the lower courts or the un-
announced rule, or perhaps a belief that society will not accept it. 
Popular acceptance, however, has at least something to do with 
constitutional legitimacy, and the need for doctrine to be suscepti-
ble to application by lower courts is a useful check on the Court’s 
ability to engage in what Professors Balkin and Levinson call “low 
politics”—reaching a particular result because that result, rather 
than the rule that produces it, is seen as desirable.138 It may be that 
some cases are significant enough that getting the right answer is 
135 See Berman, Piercing the Surface, supra note 50, at 1501–04. 
136 See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting debate 
over significance of Cleburne and difficulties for lower courts). 
137 See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rational-
ity Review, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 65 (1992) (suggesting that the Court uses two different 
forms of rational basis review in an unpredictable fashion); R. Randall Kelso, Stan-
dards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doc-
trines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme 
Court Practice, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 225, 236 (2002) (identifying seven forms of ra-
tional basis review); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermedi-
ate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779, 801–03 (1987) (noting the confu-
sion that heightened rational basis review causes lower courts and legislatures). 
138 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1061–63 (2002) (distinguishing between high and low poli-
tics). 
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more important than following existing doctrine, but a Court that 
engages in subterfuge rather than explaining itself denies the rest 
of us the opportunity to evaluate that judgment.139
Perhaps the best that can be said for subterfuge is that it offers 
an implicit reminder that decision rules and operative propositions 
diverge. By deciding a particular case in accordance with the op-
erative proposition, and not the decision rule, the Court offers an 
object lesson to lower courts and society—particular practices, it 
suggests, should not be deemed constitutionally unproblematic 
merely because they would survive a conventional doctrinal analy-
sis. But the Court could achieve this goal more cleanly by explicitly 
announcing the distinction—by stating, for example, that it is up-
holding a practice the Justices believe is unconstitutional because it 
has chosen to leave primary responsibility for enforcing a particu-
lar operative proposition with nonjudicial actors. Additionally, it 
could distinguish operative propositions and decision rules consis-
tently in its cases. As the next Part discusses, however, its recent 
tendency has been instead to deny the distinction entirely. 
VI. THE MAJOR PROBLEM: CALCIFICATION 
I have argued that a standard pattern replays itself in develop-
ment of constitutional doctrine. In its early encounters with a par-
ticular constitutional provision, the Court tends to stay quite close 
to the constitutional operative proposition. As time passes, doc-
trine becomes more complex. Judicial experience with the sort of 
problems presented by adjudication under a particular provision 
leads to the development of decision rules that depart from the op-
erative proposition. When initially articulating such decision rules, 
the Court frequently explains what it is doing, and why—that, for 
instance, it is deferring to congressional determinations about ef-
fects on commerce because of legislative competence, or that it is 
ratcheting up the level of scrutiny for gender-based discrimination 
because of pervasive prejudice and stereotyping. Decision rules 
139 Cleburne plainly is not such a case. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), from one 
perspective, might have been, and there the Court was a little more candid—it articu-
lated a new equal protection doctrine to be applied in that case alone. See id. at 109 
(“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal 
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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may lose fit over time if facts or background understandings 
change. When this happens, the Court may—indeed, should—
change the decision rule to fit the new circumstances. In doing so, 
the Court is simply employing a new method to implement an un-
changing operative proposition. 
But this account of the normal life cycle of decision rules does 
not offer a complete picture. Sometimes, when a stable jurispru-
dential regime has persisted for a period of time, decision rules can 
start to be mistaken for constitutional operative propositions.140 
When this happens, a number of undesirable consequences follow. 
These consequences include ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts 
to bind nonjudicial actors to decision rules rather than operative 
propositions, and an undoing of the benefits of decision rules. I 
consider these problems in turn. 
A. Doctrinal Deformation 
Confusing decision rules and operative propositions warps doc-
trine in two related ways. A court may discard decision rules not 
because they have lost fit but because they do not make sense as 
operative propositions. Alternatively, it may accept them as opera-
tive propositions and make other doctrinal changes, in the same or 
related fields, in order to maintain consistency. 
1. The Commerce Clause 
Congressional power under the pre-Lopez Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence was famously unbounded.141 This is not to say that the 
Constitution imposed no limits; it did. According to the operative 
propositions I have drawn from McCulloch v. Maryland, Congress 
could pass only legislation that was a useful or convenient means of 
regulating commerce, and it could do so only in order to regulate 
140 Professor Sager noted the similar tendency “to equate the existence of a constitu-
tional norm with the possibility of its enforcement against an offending official.” 
Sager, supra note 19, at 1221. Professor Sager was concerned that other decisionmak-
ers not believe that the lack of enforcement indicated an absence of constitutional 
rules. This Article focuses on the problems that arise when courts equate the possibil-
ity of enforcement with the demands of the Constitution, and it deals with both un-
derenforcing and overenforcing rules. 
141 See Kozinski, supra note 80, at 5. 
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commerce.142 The limits set by these operative propositions, how-
ever, depend in one case on a factual issue and in the other on 
something like the subjective motive of the enacting Congress. 
Given that the post-New Deal Court neither claimed superior 
competence with respect to legislative facts nor ventured to assess 
subjective motivation, the decision rules it adopted regarding these 
limits were deferential to the point of committing the determina-
tion almost entirely to Congress. 
United States v. Lopez143 and United States v. Morrison144 an-
nounced that this almost-complete deference was unacceptable, 
and set about imposing judicially enforceable limits. This subsec-
tion describes what happened in those cases from the decision rules 
perspective. A plausible first take might be that the Court in Lopez 
and Morrison recognized that the extant decision rules had lost fit. 
It was a commonplace observation that Congress seldom deployed 
its institutional expertise by actually making the factual determina-
tion upon which its power was supposed to rest.145 The Gun-Free 
School Zones Act, struck down in Lopez, was not accompanied by 
any findings explaining the relation of guns near schools to inter-
state commerce.146 Equally alarming, even when regulated activities 
clearly did substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress was 
frequently regulating them for other reasons—something that, if 
we take McCulloch’s pretext passage seriously, might be unconsti-
tutional.147
142 See supra Section IV.B. 
143 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
144 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
145 See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to 
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57, 98 (1986) (noting that “Congress has 
neither a strong tradition of constitutional decisionmaking nor trustworthy proce-
dures for addressing constitutional questions”); cf. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the 
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 
46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695, 711 (noting Congress’s willingness to engage in “sus-
tained and increasingly thoughtful” fact finding to justify Commerce Clause legisla-
tion during the New Deal era). 
146 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting lack of findings). 
147 In a 1963 letter to the Department of Justice, Professor Gerald Gunther objected 
to the use of the Commerce Clause to justify civil rights legislation, commenting that 
“[t]he proposed end run by way of the commerce clause seems to me ill-advised in 
every respect. . . . It would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce 
clause to invoke it as the basis for this legislation.” Gerald Gunther, Cases and Mate-
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Congress’s refusal to exercise the competence to which the 
Court was supposed to defer, coupled with repeated pretextual 
uses of the commerce power, might well have suggested to the 
Court that it was confronting a pattern of constitutional violations. 
Just as it had adopted heightened equal protection scrutiny in re-
sponse to the pervasiveness of invidious gender-based discrimina-
tion, the Court might have felt justified in adopting a less deferen-
tial decision rule for reviewing Commerce Clause legislation. 
Frequency of constitutional violations is not the only factor that 
could be invoked to support a less deferential decision rule. The 
Court also might have believed that Congress could no longer be 
trusted to restrain itself within constitutional bounds. A plausible 
story can be told along the lines of the sort of process analysis that 
Carolene Products Co. v. United States148 employs. One of the pur-
poses of overlapping state and federal sovereignties is to make the 
two governments compete for the affection of the people.149 They 
do so, in part, by providing legislation to solve particular problems. 
The people probably care little, if at all, which government is solv-
ing their problems, and they are consequently willing to accept 
federal solutions to problems that state and local governments are 
competent to handle. When U.S. senators were selected by state 
legislatures, a counterweight existed against excessive federal activ-
ity. State legislatures want to solve the problems that they can, and 
federal solutions prevent them from getting credit from their con-
stituents. Thus, state legislatures were likely to select senators who 
would respect the appropriate sphere of state legislative power and 
reserve federal power for uniquely federal problems. With the 
Seventeenth Amendment providing for direct election of senators, 
this check on the exercise of federal power was eliminated. Exces-
sive federal regulation was the natural consequence,150 and concern 
that the Seventeenth Amendment had eliminated a structural pro-
rials on Constitutional Law 203 (10th ed. 1980), quoted in Paul Brest et al., Processes 
of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 471 (4th ed. 2000). 
148 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
149 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1428 
(1987). 
150 Such concerns were voiced at the time of ratification. See Ralph A. Rossum, The 
Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seven-
teenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 712–14 (1999) (noting federalism-
based arguments against direct election). 
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tection of federalism might offer a reason to be less willing to trust 
the good faith of Congress.151
The problem with casting Lopez and Morrison as the reaction to 
a loss of fit is twofold. First, the rules the Court adopted make very 
little sense from that perspective. A pattern of congressional fail-
ure to make the determination that a regulated activity substan-
tially affected interstate commerce supports a decision rule requir-
ing explicit findings or some showing that Congress had considered 
the issue. Concern about pretextual legislation might have sug-
gested similar demands—either evidence of congressional atten-
tion to effects on interstate commerce, or even a heightened 
means-end fit requirement.152 Even an inarticulate yearning for 
federalism of the sort that seems to be driving the Court’s sover-
eign immunity cases (which, after Alden v. Maine153 can no longer 
be called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence) would have sug-
gested something like the short-lived National League of Cities v. 
Usery154 protection of integral state functions. 
But the Court gave us none of the rules that would be justified 
by a loss of fit. Process-based federalism was suggested by a num-
151 Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison considered the relevance of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, making the point that it was not a “rip[] in the fabric of the Framers’ 
Constitution, inviting judicial repairs.” 529 U.S. 598, 652 (2000) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). This certainly is true in terms of operative propositions: if an amendment 
changes the Constitution, the Court is not justified in fighting its natural and intended 
consequences. Use of the federal commerce power that seems excessive in terms of 
the “appropriate” balance between state and federal regulation is one such conse-
quence, and the Court has no business trying to check it. But increased unconstitu-
tional use—notably, pretextual legislation—also is predictable, and the Seventeenth 
Amendment did not change the scope of the commerce power. To the extent that the 
Seventeenth Amendment undermined the reasons to believe that Congress could be 
trusted not to engage in pretextual legislation, it might justify a less deferential deci-
sion rule. Neither Lopez nor Morrison, however, relied on this point. 
152 Changing the decision rules to focus on pretext would probably have seemed un-
appealing for two reasons. First, inquiries into legislative purpose are difficult, intru-
sive, and invite legislative dissembling in response. Second, adoption of such a rule 
would likely have suggested that broad swaths of civil rights legislation were unconsti-
tutional, an almost unimaginable step for the Court to take. 
153 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives 
from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
154 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976) (striking down Fair Labor Standards Act amendments as 
applied to state employers as interference with “traditional aspects of state sover-
eignty”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985).
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ber of academics in the wake of Lopez,155 but it was rejected by 
Morrison, which disregarded a “mountain” of findings.156 The limits 
the Court announced in Morrison, which give an incompletely de-
fined significance to noncommercial activity, attenuated causal 
chains, and areas of traditional state concern, do not make sense as 
decision rules designed to better enforce the substantial effects op-
erative proposition. Nor do they make much sense as operative 
propositions in their own right: The lines they draw track neither 
core exercises of the commerce power, such as protection of inter-
state commerce, nor areas of significance to states.157 In fact, they 
are dredged from the cases as more or less the only things that the 
pre-Lopez Court had not gotten around to explicitly endorsing—
though Wickard v. Filburn came perilously close. 
This brings us to the second problem with viewing Lopez and 
Morrison as reactions to a loss of fit. The Court did not present its 
new federalism rules as responses to changed circumstances or 
even a sensible means of protecting some substantive value of fed-
eralism. It presented them as deductions from a structural argu-
ment: The federal government is one of enumerated powers, there-
fore some limits must exist, and these are the limits that precedent 
allows.158
Structural argument is powerful, and the one deployed in Lopez 
and Morrison is unassailable, at least as far as its first two steps go. 
But it does not resolve the question presented by Lopez and Mor-
rison, because it is an argument about operative propositions. It 
says nothing about what decision rules should be adopted to im-
plement those operative propositions. To say that limits to the 
commerce power exist is not to say how courts should enforce 
155 See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 145, at 697 (concluding that “the approach taken in 
Lopez may be a plausible technique to encourage appropriate congressional proce-
dures and consideration”); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. 
Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 207 (1995).
156 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. at 659 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “any substantive limitation will ap-
ply randomly in terms of the interests the majority seeks to protect”).
158 See Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at 2054 (arguing that “there is an indistinct but 
urgent apprehension that the Court must draw ‘real limits’ that have ‘substance’”); 
Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1295, 1323 (1997) 
(“The actual limiting principle, then, on which Chief Justice Rehnquist can be said to 
rely in Lopez, is the weirdly circular proposition that there must be a limiting princi-
ple.”). 
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them, or even that courts should enforce them at all. The Court in 
Lopez and Morrison assumed that its decision rules were operative 
propositions and rejected them because they seemed implausible 
as such. 
That conclusion is a non-sequitur, as the dissenters observed.159 
Reasons for less deferential review of the congressional determina-
tion that a law was within the scope of the commerce power may 
well have existed—I have suggested some—but the Lopez and 
Morrison majorities did not offer them and did not articulate deci-
sion rules responsive to those reasons. Instead, the Court assumed 
that the existence of limits implied judicially enforceable limits.160 
Existing doctrine did not provide these—the substantial effects 
test, as Justice Breyer pointed out, suggested deference, “because 
the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a 
legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy.”161 
Thus, the Court transformed its decision rules to make the key 
questions ones more plausibly within the sphere of judicial compe-
tence.162 That, ultimately, seems the best explanation for the rules 
that Morrison and Lopez announced. Whether the regulated activ-
ity is commercial, the causal chain attenuated, or the area one of 
traditional state concern are not the relevant questions on any rea-
sonable understanding of either federalism or the operative propo-
159 Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison and Justice Breyer’s in Lopez both make the 
point that the question of substantial effect is one for Congress in the first instance. 
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The fact of such a substantial 
effect is not an issue for the courts in the first instance, but for the Congress . . . .” (ci-
tation omitted)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution 
requires us to judge the connection between a regulated activity and interstate com-
merce, not directly, but at one remove.”). 
160 See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review 226 (2004) (describing the Rehnquist Court as adopting “a jurispru-
dence that treats constitutional limits as synonymous with judicial enforcement and 
that, as a result, calls for the Court to adopt an aggressive stance vis-à-vis the political 
branches”). 
161 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
162 The nature of the substantial effects question was debated in Lopez and Morri-
son. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s trans-
formation of substantial effects question into one “dependent upon a uniquely judicial 
competence”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (asserting that whether an activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce “is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative 
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court” (quoting Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)). 
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sition underlying the Commerce Clause. But they are ones that the 
Court can claim for itself. 
The failure to distinguish between decision rules and operative 
propositions has thus led the Court to reject its Commerce Clause 
decision rules for patently inadequate reasons. Worse, it has led 
the Court to replace them not with new decision rules crafted to 
better enforce the operative proposition in light of changed cir-
cumstances—something I have suggested would be at least par-
tially defensible—but rather with a congeries of ad hoc quasi-
categorical lines designed to preserve judicial supremacy. The 
Court suggests that these are operative propositions—that Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power truly does not extend to non-
commercial activities within the historical scope of state regulation 
affecting interstate commerce only via an attenuated causal 
chain—but it does not seem to believe its own protestations. When 
confronted with a regulation of such activity that really was an at-
tempt to protect interstate commerce, the Court upheld it with 
very little discussion. 
That case was Pierce County v. Guillen, in which the Court up-
held a federal law protecting from discovery information collected 
by states in connection with federal highway safety programs.163 As 
Professor Mitchell Berman describes at greater length, this statute 
“regulated apparently non-commercial activity . . . and interfered 
with a traditional area of state sovereignty.”164 Professor Berman 
suggests, and I agree, that the Guillen Court upheld the statute be-
cause the Lopez majority does in fact believe that the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, as a matter of operative propo-
sitions, grant Congress the power to regulate intrastate noncom-
mercial activity traditionally within state sovereignty so long as it is 
doing so for interstate commercial ends.165 That is, the Court seems 
to understand the operative proposition as something like substan-
tial effects with a pretext carve-out—exactly what McCulloch sug-
gested. The discomfort that gave rise to Lopez and Morrison was 
with the decision rules that earlier Courts had crafted to implement 
that operative proposition. 
163 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003). 
164 Berman, Piercing the Surface, supra note 50, at 1489. 
165 Id. at 1518; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215–18 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (discussing import of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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Understanding that these were decision rules might have al-
lowed the Court to modify them in ways that would produce a bet-
ter fit in the changed circumstances of a national economy and a 
popularly elected Senate. Because it treated the decision rules as 
operative propositions, however, the Court created a new doctrinal 
test that makes no sense as either a decision rule or an operative 
proposition. The willingness to engage in subterfuge in Guillen 
demonstrates the Court’s own awareness of the inadequacy. 
2. Equal Protection 
Up until at least the late 1970s, equal protection jurisprudence 
followed the lines set out in footnote four of Carolene Products, 
and it did so self-consciously in terms of decision rules. That is, the 
Court repeatedly asserted that the operative proposition behind 
the Equal Protection Clause was essentially a prohibition on in-
vidious discrimination or a requirement that the government have 
a legitimate reason for differential treatment.166 It implemented this 
rule through a regime that deferred to the legislative judgment in 
the ordinary case, but adopted less deferential review or anti-
deferential review of laws that burdened the interests of groups 
that were politically weak or that had been the targets of invidious 
discrimination in the past, especially if the attitudes producing such 
discrimination still persisted. 
Focus on these factors makes perfect sense. As the Carolene 
Products Court saw, and Professor John Hart Ely emphasized, a 
legislature’s cost-benefit calculus is less trustworthy if the burdens 
of a law fall on a group with little political voice, or if the legisla-
ture is likely to hold mistaken views about the attributes or prefer-
ences of members of the burdened group.167 Things changed as the 
battle over affirmative action gained greater political promi-
nence.168 First in a case involving a city council, and then with the 
166 See supra Section IV.C. 
167 See Ely, supra note 42, at 103. Thus, in Ely’s analysis, prejudice is relevant in two 
ways. First, it may prevent a group from forming coalitions and winning benefits 
through the normal process of interest group politics. Second, it may lead legislators 
to err in their cost-benefit analysis, even if they perform the analysis with proper con-
cern for members of the burdened group. Id. at 157, 161. 
168 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court fractured badly over 
an affirmative action program. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, joined by Justice 
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federal government, the Court announced that legislation discrimi-
nating in favor of racial minorities would also receive strict scru-
tiny.169
For anyone with a sense of how the tiers of scrutiny had devel-
oped, this was a surprising result. Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena explains it by invoking 
three themes: skepticism of racial classifications, consistency in ap-
plication of equal protection, and congruence between the rules 
applied to the federal government and those applied to the states.170 
Taken together, she reasoned, the three principles established that 
“any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any 
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial 
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under 
the strictest judicial scrutiny.”171
The second of these principles has done most of the work in 
bringing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence to where it is 
today. Justice O’Connor traces the demand for consistency back to 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke.172 In fact, it can be found substantially earlier. In the Civil 
Rights Cases, Justice Bradley announced that at some point, blacks 
must cease to be “the special favorite of the laws,” and their rights 
“protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are 
protected.”173 As Professor Richard Primus has observed, Justice 
Bradley’s criticism of antidiscrimination measures was misplaced; 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which Justice Bradley’s opinion struck 
White, rejected the petitioners’ argument that heightened scrutiny should apply only 
to laws burdening “discrete and insular minorities,” on the grounds that “[t]he guar-
antee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded 
the same protection, then it is not equal.” Id. at 289–90 (quoting United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Justice Powell’s reasoning, I will argue, 
is what has driven the progress to strict scrutiny for affirmative action, and it illus-
trates the fundamental problem of mistaking decision rules for operative propositions. 
169 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
170 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223–24. 
171 Id. at 224. 
172 See id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90). The concern about consistency also is 
featured in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, where it was mentioned as one 
of the reasons not to count the mentally handicapped as a suspect class. 473 U.S. 432, 
443–45 (1985). 
173 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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down, granted no special privileges to blacks but simply forbade all 
racial discrimination.174 “Today,” Professor Primus continues, “such 
criticism of facially neutral antidiscrimination laws seems tenden-
tious and farfetched. . . . The issue today is the legitimacy of overt 
racial preferences . . . .”175
Interestingly, however, the argument for heightened scrutiny of 
racial preferences turns out to be quite similar to Justice Brad-
ley’s—that is, it attacks as special favoritism a regime that is in fact 
neutral. The argument is simple: if racial classifications burdening 
minorities are subject to strict scrutiny, so too must be all racial 
classifications. As Justice Powell put it in Bakke, in language echo-
ing Justice Bradley’s, racial minorities cannot be “special wards en-
titled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others”: 
they cannot be the special favorites of the Constitution.176
As an argument about the substantive meaning of the Constitu-
tion, this makes good sense. An Equal Protection Clause that per-
mitted discrimination against a particular group only for compel-
ling reasons but allowed discrimination in their favor with a lesser 
justification would hardly deserve the name. But it is not an argu-
ment that makes much sense with respect to decision rules. Deci-
sion rules are adapted to particular cases and contexts; they are ad 
hoc responses to a changing landscape. They frequently will lack 
some of the attributes (such as symmetry) that we demand of con-
stitutional operative propositions. Indeed, if understood as consti-
tutional operative propositions, they will frequently seem obvi-
ously wrong. 
An asymmetrical Equal Protection Clause is an absurdity: Equal 
protection is a shield against invidious discrimination, and of 
course it must shield all people equally. The tiers of scrutiny, how-
ever, are decision rules adopted in the equal protection context 
based not on how costly particular forms of discrimination were 
deemed to be, but rather on how likely they were to be invidious. 
The factors that make discrimination against a particular group 
174 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 493, 526 (2003). 
175 Id. 
176 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Morality of Consent 133 (1975) (arguing that affirmative action means that 
“[t]hose for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others”).
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likely to be invidious—lack of political power, past and current 
prejudice, a history of discriminatory treatment—obviously do not 
convey similar information about discrimination in favor of that 
group. If anything, they suggest the contrary—such discrimination 
is especially likely not to be invidious.177
The argument that consistency demands strict scrutiny for af-
firmative action, then, is mistaken in much the same way as Justice 
Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. The operative proposi-
tion of equal protection is indeed symmetrical, protecting no per-
son more than any other. But decision rules will have special favor-
ites, as long as, and to the extent that, state actors have special 
victims. 
The consistency argument in favor of strict scrutiny for affirma-
tive action is driven by the confusion of decision rules and opera-
tive propositions. The decision rules perspective allows us to see 
that a demand for consistency in operative propositions does not 
support a similar demand with respect to decision rules. It also, I 
believe, gives us a useful vantage point from which to assess the 
Court’s current approach to equal protection. Decision rules make 
sense, I have argued, to the extent that they can be derived from 
operative propositions by means of the application of certain fac-
tors that suggest greater or lesser deference to legislative judg-
ments. What sort of factors support strict scrutiny of affirmative ac-
tion? 
Distrust of the legislature’s ability to give equal weight to the in-
terests of those it is burdening—the basic Carolene Products con-
cern—cuts no ice here. Nor is there any history of invidious dis-
crimination by majorities against themselves. Indeed, the 
constitutional argument against affirmative action is not that it is 
invidious in the sense of being inspired by animus.178 Instead, Ada-
177 See Ely, supra note 42, at 170 (“There is no danger that the coalition that makes 
up the white majority in our society is going to deny to whites generally their right to 
equal concern and respect.”). 
178 Justice O’Connor does come close to suggesting that affirmative action may be 
motivated by hostility towards its purported beneficiaries. See, e.g., City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into 
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining 
what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact moti-
vated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”). However, 
the alternative to benign here appears to be not “invidious” but rather “not cost-
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rand’s analysis suggests a different factor at work. “[A]ny individ-
ual,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “suffers an injury when he or she is 
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race . . . .”179 
The gravity of the injury is determined not by the magnitude of the 
disadvantage, but by the use of the racial classification.180 Strict 
scrutiny is applied not to detect animus but to assess whether the 
government’s interest is weighty enough to justify the infliction of 
this injury. This explanation can in fact be cast in terms of the fac-
tors I have discussed as driving the creation of particular decision 
rules. It boils down to the proposition that racial classifications are 
high-cost laws. 
The high cost of a law can support non-deferential review, but as 
the sole factor, it tends to be inadequate. This is because the bal-
ancing of burdens and benefits, even large ones, is usually left to 
legislatures for reasons of both institutional competence and elec-
toral accountability.181 There is no reason to suppose that the Court 
will be any better at deciding whether a particular high-cost law is 
cost-justified, and in a democracy, such balancing plausibly belongs 
primarily with the legislature.182 Indeed, it is just those arguments 
justified.” See id. (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. 
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote no-
tions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”). Thus, as Professor 
Jed Rubenfeld observes, the purpose of strict scrutiny has shifted from smoking-out 
to balancing. Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 465. 
179 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995). 
180 Thus the fact that affirmative action programs impose only a statistically minimal 
disadvantage on white applicants, see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke 
and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1078–80 
(2002), is not relevant to the Court’s calculus. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650–51 
(1993) (suggesting that racial classification in redistricting by itself is an injury, regard-
less of effects on voting power). 
181 Justice Stevens made a similar point in his Adarand dissent: 
I am not persuaded that the psychological damage brought on by affirmative ac-
tion is as severe as that engendered by racial subordination. That, in any event, 
is a judgment the political branches can be trusted to make. . . . If the legislature 
is persuaded that its program is doing more harm than good to the individuals it 
is designed to benefit, then we can expect the legislature to remedy the prob-
lem. Significantly, this is not true of a government action based on invidious 
discrimination. 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 248 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
182 The chief value of judicial review in such cases, I have suggested, is that the judi-
ciary may serve as a second negative, and one less susceptible to the temporary ex-
cesses of popular sentiment that can infect legislatures. See supra Section III.A. But 
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that make modern fundamental rights substantive due process ju-
risprudence look illegitimate.183
One of the ironies of the affirmative action cases, then, is that 
those Justices who most strongly deplore unwarranted judicial in-
trusion into democratic decisionmaking in the due process arena 
support a similar intervention in the name of equal protection, in 
spite of the similarities between the two areas. Like the Due Proc-
ess Clause, the Equal Protection Clause offers a general and highly 
abstract principle. It makes no more mention of race than the Due 
Process Clause does of abortion or child-rearing. What is required 
to get specific decision rules out of these general propositions is a 
theory about when legislatures cannot be trusted. 
Here the foes of affirmative action stand perhaps on weaker 
ground than the proponents of fundamental rights due process. 
The heavy burden imposed by laws prohibiting abortion or same-
sex sodomy is fairly clear.184 The high cost of a racial classification is 
somewhat less obvious, and the Court has never offered any em-
pirical evidence for its existence. Instead, the Justices tend to write 
as though the Equal Protection Clause simply contained a cate-
gorical ban on racial classifications.185 The Reconstruction Congress 
did give us some such concrete negations, notably the Thirteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.186 But the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not ban any particular practice with similar specificity. If the 
members of the Reconstruction Congress thought they were flatly 
prohibiting anything, it was probably invidious discrimination 
against blacks. They did not think they were categorically prohibit-
ing race-based remedial measures; they enacted some themselves.187
affirmative action programs are not generally adopted in response to popular hys-
teria. 
183 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 923 (1973). 
184 See Ely, supra note 183, at 923. 
185 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“What the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are 
classifications made on the basis of race.”). 
186 The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery, U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits disenfranchisement on racial grounds. U.S. Const. 
amend. XV, § 1. The term “concrete negation” I owe to Professor Richard Primus. 
Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 7 (1999). 
187 See Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 430–31. 
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The assertion that racial classifications are generally prohibited, 
then, is not plausible as an account of the operative proposition 
behind the Equal Protection Clause. It is supported neither by text 
nor history. It must be defended as a decision rule, and here the 
only justification put forward is that racial classifications are high 
cost.188 This can be a partial justification, but its application to af-
firmative action shows its deficiencies in a particularly glaring light. 
The decision rules perspective, I have noted, allows one to de-
scribe the march of equal protection as the story of a progressive 
Court ratifying the achievements of social movements. Groups 
make their claims for equal treatment, and at a certain point the 
Court steps in and announces that the struggle is over: Discrimina-
tion against that group has been established as invidious, and it will 
no longer be allowed.189 If equal protection jurisprudence focuses 
on classifications rather than classes, however, the story is some-
what different. Historically downtrodden groups make their claims, 
and after they have achieved a certain degree of success, the Court 
steps in and announces that they cannot be treated differently at 
all. Discrimination against them is no longer allowed, but the inter-
est group politics that long disfavored them cannot be used to their 
advantage. The government may grant subsidies to farmers, mar-
ried couples, or the unemployed; universities can adopt preferen-
tial admission policies for athletes, flautists, alumni children, or ap-
plicants from remote geographical regions.190 Racial minorities, 
almost alone, cannot be favored, and if we ask why, the reason is 
188 The Court also has observed that racial classifications are “‘in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited.’” Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). This is at 
best an extremely odd thing to say. Legions of irrelevant classifications receive ra-
tional basis review, and as Justice Ginsburg has observed, “[o]ur jurisprudence ranks 
race a ‘suspect’ category’” not because it is irrelevant but “‘because it is one which 
usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial 
inequality.’” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931–32 (2d Cir. 
1968)). 
189 See supra Section IV.C. 
190 Surprisingly, Justice Thomas made much of this point in arguing against the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Equal Protection Clause 
does not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other 
kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures.”). 
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essentially that they have been discriminated against in the past. 
In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado constitu-
tional amendment that barred gays and lesbians from securing pro-
tection under local antidiscrimination ordinances.191 Such an exclu-
sion of a group from the ordinary play of politics was 
“unprecedented in our jurisprudence,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “a 
denial of equal protection . . . in the most literal sense” and “inex-
plicable by anything but animus.”192 Some of that may be true, but 
not the unprecedented part. This prohibition on using the political 
process to gain advantage is exactly what current equal protection 
jurisprudence does to racial minorities. 
The argument that the Equal Protection Clause cannot make 
some people more equal than others alludes to Animal Farm,193 but 
it is the Court’s current jurisprudence that is truly Orwellian. It 
makes sense neither as operative proposition nor as decision rule, 
and it is hardly surprising that the consequence has been subter-
fuge: the unusually enervated form of strict scrutiny employed by 
by the Grutter majority.194 Subterfuge is the natural response to 
doctrine that appears to direct the wrong outcome, and if doctrine 
has changed from a shield for politically weak groups to a barrier 
that stops majorities from accepting disadvantage in order to pro-
mote racial equality, it will continue to generate results that seem 
unjust under the Equal Protection Clause. 
3. Congressional Enforcement Powers 
The key question with respect to congressional enforcement 
powers is how courts are to determine the existence of a constitu-
tional violation that the enforcement powers may be deployed to 
remedy or deter. The early cases reflect the understanding that, 
like the existence of the substantial effect on interstate commerce 
required for exercises of the commerce power, the existence of 
such a constitutional violation is a determination for Congress in 
the first instance, with deferential review by the Court.195 More-
191 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996). 
192 Id. at 632, 633. 
193 George Orwell, Animal Farm (1946). 
194 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
195 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“[Section] 5 is a positive 
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determin-
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over, in making that determination, Congress was allowed to de-
ploy its own institutional competence and was not bound by the 
rules of administration that restrained judicial review. From the 
decision rules perspective, this meant that Congress was allowed to 
legislate in response to violations of operative propositions, not 
merely decision rules. That is, Congress could identify as unconsti-
tutional practices that the Court would not strike down.196 Again, as 
the Court lost sight of the distinction between decision rules and 
operative propositions, this understanding collapsed. City of 
Boerne v. Flores was the first step.197
In Boerne, the Court considered the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (“RFRA”). Enacted, as the legislative history candidly 
confessed, “to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in [Employ-
ment Division v.] Smith,”198 RFRA sought to restore the test of 
Sherbert v. Verner.199
Whether RFRA was appropriate enforcement legislation thus 
turned on the relationship between Smith and Sherbert, or rather, 
on the nature of the free exercise right. If free exercise is a funda-
mental right, which the Court decided for institutional reasons to 
underenforce in Smith, then RFRA was simply an instance of Con-
gress legislating to the full extent of the operative proposition, 
something the earlier cases had suggested was plainly within its 
power. If, however, free exercise is only a right against laws that 
target religious belief, which the Court overenforced in Sherbert, 
then RFRA adopted such a broadly prophylactic rule that it might 
well seem to pass the bounds of appropriate legislation. 
Boerne took the latter view, but it spent no time discussing the 
ing whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
196 Morgan is difficult to read, but that this is what Justice Brennan was thinking 
when he wrote the opinion can be gleaned from his opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 
U.S. 112, 246 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“But 
there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be compelled 
to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as our decisions 
have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial power under 
the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
197 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
198 S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1902. 
199 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000) (citing to 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).  
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relationship between the operative free exercise proposition and 
the different decision rules of Smith and Sherbert. Instead, it 
seemed to take for granted that Smith, as the Court’s latest word 
on the subject, set out precisely the scope of the free exercise right. 
State regulations that would survive the Smith test, it assumed, 
were necessarily constitutional. The question on which the Court 
focused was whether RFRA was “congruent and proportional” to 
the rule of Smith, not to the free exercise right itself.200
This does not make the outcome in Boerne wrong. Whether one 
thinks the decision correct turns largely on one’s theory of the Free 
Exercise Clause, and those who believe that it is a merely a right 
against targeting (the rule of Smith) tend to find Boerne correct, 
regardless of their views on the proper scope of the Section Five 
power. Professor Larry Sager believes that Congress can legislate 
to the full scope of underenforced rights but argues that Smith ac-
curately depicts the free exercise operative proposition and that 
RFRA’s prophylaxis was too broad.201 On the other side, Professor 
Michael McConnell shares an expansive view of the Section Five 
power,202 but criticizes Boerne on the grounds that Smith is an 
underenforcing rule: 
[T]he Smith decision was based not on what “free exercise of re-
ligion” means (either historically or normatively), but on the in-
stitutional point that “democratic government,” despite its ad-
mitted inability to accord full and equal accommodation to all 
religious denominations, is to be “preferred” to a system in 
which courts make highly subjective and intrusive judgments that 
200 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (observing that “[l]aws valid under Smith would fall 
under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing 
free exercise”). 
201 See Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as Partner/Congress as Adversary, 22 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 85, 85–86, 89 (1998) (“RFRA requires the Supreme Court to act as 
though constitutional religious liberty has a radically different shape than the Court 
justifiably believes it to have.”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 
1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 83 (1998) (“Where the Constitution’s objective was to protect 
religious believers against unfair imposition of special disadvantages, RFRA privi-
leged religious believers in a way that was both normatively unattractive and practi-
cally unworkable.”). 
202 McConnell, supra note 33, at 171 (suggesting that “Congress may be seen as hav-
ing some degree of authority to determine for itself what the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment mean”). 
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“weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of 
all religious beliefs.”203
The tendency to equate constitutional meaning with judicial de-
cisions, suggested in Boerne, came to full flower a few years later in 
cases involving the application of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) to the states. In Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett204 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,205 the 
Court struck down these applications, making clear that it was 
measuring Congress’s enforcement power against its decision rules. 
The operative proposition behind the Equal Protection Clause, 
which Congress claimed to be enforcing, prohibits invidious dis-
crimination, and in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court had stated 
explicitly that Section Five legislation was justified if Congress rea-
sonably found a particular practice invidious. But Garrett and Ki-
mel focused not on invidiousness but on irrationality, what would 
be required for the Court to strike down discrimination on non-
suspect categories such as age and disability. 
Kimel began with the premise that “[s]tates may discriminate on 
the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if 
the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest” and went on to measure the ADEA “against the ra-
tional basis standard of our equal protection jurisprudence.”206 Be-
cause the Act “prohibits substantially more state employment deci-
sions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional 
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard,” the 
Court found that it crossed the boundary from enforcement legisla-
tion to an impermissible “attempt to substantively redefine the 
States’ legal obligations.”207
Garrett offers an even sharper display of the unthinking equation 
of constitutionality with the outcome of adjudication. The opinion 
203 Id. at 156 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)); see also 
Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1, 59 
(1993) (“Smith indicates that it is a decision about institutional arrangements more 
than about substantive merits.”). 
204 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
205 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). 
206 Id. at 83, 87. 
207 Id. at 86, 88. 
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comes very close to saying that invidious discrimination against the 
disabled is constitutionally acceptable. Though negative attitudes 
and fear, the Court observed, “may often accompany irrational 
(and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence 
alone does not a constitutional violation make.”208 After demanding 
that Congress find irrationality as a predicate for the exercise of its 
enforcement power, the Court assessed the congruence and pro-
portionality of the ADA by comparing it to adjudication, right 
down to the allocation of the burden of proof.209
Justice Breyer’s dissent made the obvious reply that by using the 
rational basis test as the standard of constitutionality, the majority 
had adopted the wrong yardstick: “[N]either the ‘burden of proof’ 
that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to 
judges applies to Congress when it exercises its [Section Five] 
power.”210 Justice Breyer also suggested that Congress should be 
required only to find invidious (rather than irrational) discrimina-
tion.211 My purpose here is not simply to repeat that observation 
but to locate Garrett and Kimel within a larger jurisprudential 
trend. Repeatedly, the Court has come to treat its decision rules as 
if they were operative propositions, and repeatedly the confusion 
208 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367; see also id. at 370 (“‘[A]dverse, disparate treatment’ of-
ten does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational-basis scrutiny ap-
plies.”). 
209 Id. at 372. 
210 Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer went on to argue that “[t]here is 
simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exer-
cise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court’s institu-
tional limitations” and followed with an analysis of differing judicial and legislative 
competencies. Id. at 384–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 377–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting support in the legislative record for 
“Congress’ finding that the adverse treatment of persons with disabilities was often 
arbitrary or invidious”). Academics have amplified the point, notably Professors 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel, in a series of excellent articles. See Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions 
on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1, 8–11 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protect-
ing the Constitution from the People]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Pro-
tection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 Yale L.J. 441, 464–65 (2000). Professors Post and Siegel are not working entirely 
within the decision rules perspective, however, as they seem to believe that their posi-
tion requires granting Congress “equal interpretive authority” with respect to the con-
tent of the Constitution’s operative propositions. See Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at 
1947. 
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has warped the doctrine.212
In each of the contexts I have discussed, the Court began with a 
principle that seemed unassailable. Of course, one might think, the 
commerce power cannot be entirely unbounded. Of course, the 
Equal Protection Clause cannot offer some groups more equal pro-
tection than others. And, of course, Congress cannot change the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
These are all plausible principles, if not necessarily as incontro-
vertible as the Court supposed. But they are principles relating to 
constitutional operative propositions, not to decision rules. It might 
well be the case that the Constitution leaves the job of determining 
whether the commerce power has been exceeded primarily with 
Congress. It might be the case—indeed, it almost certainly is—that 
laws burdening politically powerful groups are less likely than 
those burdening weak groups to be the product of legislative hostil-
ity or indifference. And it might be that congressional judgment as 
to whether a particular practice is invidious is sensibly reviewed in 
light of the institutional competence of Congress, and not as 
though Congress were a litigant or an inferior court. Distinguishing 
212 The current § 5 jurisprudence also seems on the way to subterfuge. In the two 
most recent cases, the Court upheld enforcement legislation as valid. Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (upholding Title II of the ADA as applied to cases 
implicating access to the courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
740 (2003) (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act). Lane may be reconciled 
with Garrett and Kimel on the grounds that the law at issue addressed discrimination 
“implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,” making it easier for Con-
gress to establish a violation of the Court’s decision rules sufficient to trigger the en-
forcement power under Garrett and Kimel. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. Hibbs is harder, 
for Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion suggests that the equal protection violation 
the FMLA sought to avert was simply disparate impact. 538 U.S. at 732. An employer 
practice of offering leave only to women would be a clear equal protection violation 
of the sort Justice Ginsburg made her early career attacking: While superficially bene-
fiting women, it would hamper their participation in the economy by making them 
less attractive employees. See id. at 736 (noting that practice of offering leave only to 
women “created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue 
to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical 
views about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees”); cf. 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–39 (1975) (striking down Social Security 
provision that granted benefits to widows, but not widowers, with minor children in 
their care). But Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to note that federally mandated 
minimum leave was appropriate because sex-neutral but inadequate leave policies 
“would exclude far more women than men from the workplace.” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 
738. That sort of disparate impact would not violate the equal protection decision 
rules. 
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between decision rules and operative propositions does not require 
any of these approaches, but it discloses possibilities that seem to 
have vanished from the Court’s sight. 
B. Articulation of Erroneous Norms 
A second problem arises when the Court equates the meaning of 
the Constitution with the outcome of constitutional cases: Such 
pronouncements create a misleading impression of the Constitu-
tion. When the Court treats its decision rules as operative proposi-
tions, it announces as constitutional truths rules that should neither 
be followed by nonjudicial actors nor internalized by the general 
public.213 The Constitution does not say that invidious discrimina-
tion against the disabled is perfectly acceptable; it is not that cal-
lous. It does not say that intrastate noncommercial activity indi-
rectly harming interstate commerce is beyond congressional 
regulation; it is not that formalistic. And it does not say that the 
majority may accept burdens in order to favor virtually any group 
except those that have historically been the targets of discrimina-
tion; it is not that perverse.214
This is not to say that the decision rules echoed in the preceding 
paragraph are mistaken, though I believe they are. It is to say that 
they require explanation and defense. Simply to announce them as 
operative propositions gives an impoverished and unattractive view 
of the Constitution and the Court alike. Some of the pronounce-
ments about race sound as ridiculous now as the embrace of a for-
mal contractual equality did a hundred years ago. The suggestion 
that strict scrutiny for affirmative action helps prevent the intern-
213 Cf. Amar, supra note 16, at 27 (“Even worse than doctrine’s regular sterility is its 
recurrent perversity.”). The problem here is in some ways the same one discussed by 
Professor Dan-Cohen: When the Court recites a decision rule as an operative proposi-
tion, it frequently “conveys . . . a normative message that opposes or detracts from the 
power” of the operative proposition. Dan-Cohen, supra note 21, at 632. It is to over-
come this problem that Dan-Cohen invokes the idea of acoustic separation in his 
thought experiment and then points to the possibility of selective transmission as its 
real-world analog. See id. at 634–36 (describing “strategies of selective transmission”). 
214 See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 
433–34 (1988) (“To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the 
issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn’t 
exist.”). 
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ment of racial minorities215 is a bad joke; Fred Korematsu did not 
receive admissions preferences to a concentration camp. More 
generally, the repeated assertion that equal protection means ex-
cluding racial minorities from the benefits of interest group politics 
is much the same cruel charade as protecting the liberty of bakers 
to work crushing hours.216 When such rules are trumpeted as the 
protectors of equality, the Constitution appears defective and the 
Court either delusional or insincere. Describing the Lochner era, 
Professor Roscoe Pound wrote, “those decisions wrought an injury 
to the courts and to the public regard for law and for constitutional 
law in particular.”217
The danger is not just a loss of public confidence in the Court or 
the Constitution. For a rather stark illustration of the costs of mis-
taking decision rules for operative propositions, consider Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.218 The plurality there held 
that the Executive did possess the authority to detain U.S. citizens 
who were “enemy combatants,” but that a detained citizen was en-
titled to some opportunity to argue before a neutral decisionmaker 
that he was not, in fact, an enemy combatant.219 Justice Thomas, 
dissenting, agreed on the constitutional operative proposition: The 
Executive may detain enemy combatants, but not loyal citizens. 
The factual determination as to whether a given individual was in 
fact an enemy combatant, however, he would have left to the good 
faith of the Executive, on the grounds that courts “lack the rele-
vant information and expertise” to review an executive determina-
tion.220
Justice Thomas’s decision rule is thus that the Executive may de-
tain anyone it pleases. Courts will not interfere; any challenge to a 
215 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (“Any retreat from 
the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error oc-
curring in the future.”). 
216 Just as the Lochner Court’s understanding of liberty of contract suggested that a 
maximum hours law violated the rights of workers as well as employers, Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1905), the Court’s current anti-classification approach 
to equal protection suggests that if classifications themselves constitute the injury, af-
firmative action programs violate the rights of their beneficiaries. Indeed, it has said 
as much in the voting rights context. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993). 
217 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454, 487 (1909). 
218 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2674 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
219 Id. at 2635 (majority opinion). 
220 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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detention will be dismissed. Like the plurality, I find this an unap-
pealing decision rule—it defers to the Executive on a factual ques-
tion courts seem quite capable of answering, and in a context in 
which the Executive has proven itself untrustworthy in the past.221 
But it need not lead to constitutional violations unless the Execu-
tive errs in its determination of enemy combatant status. That de-
termination is committed to the executive branch, but it is one that 
the Constitution requires the Executive to make in good faith. 
Now imagine that the Court comes to understand Justice Tho-
mas’s decision rule as an operative proposition: The Constitution 
gives the Executive the power to detain whomever it wants, for as 
long as it wants. At this point, things have gotten worse. Giving one 
branch of government the unreviewable authority to detain 
American citizens indefinitely is exactly the sort of threat to indi-
vidual liberty that the separation of powers is supposed to avert.222 
Once we see judicial refusal to review detentions not as a decision 
rule underenforcing the operative proposition (that the Executive 
may detain enemy combatants and no one else), but as the opera-
tive proposition itself, we have lost the idea that there exists a con-
stitutional line that the Executive has an obligation to observe. 
Still, even in this world, other branches of government and the 
general public might interpret the Constitution to offer greater 
protection to individual liberty. The Executive might decline to act 
as the Court announces it can; if not, Congress, the states, or the 
people might resist. 
Now imagine a world in which everyone has internalized this 
proposition: The Executive is constitutionally entitled to detain 
anyone it wants, for as long as it wants, for any reason whatso-
221 In Korematsu, military authorities relied on a report known to be false, and the 
Solicitor General’s office compounded the problem by not sharing with the Court its 
own knowledge of the report’s falsity. See Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417–19 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (No. CR-
27635 W), reprinted in Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American In-
ternment Cases 137–51 (Peter Irons ed., 1989). The Justices’ awareness of this histori-
cal precedent doubtless affected the degree of deference they were willing to grant 
the Executive in Hamdi. 
222 See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 67, 72 (1998) (“[A]ll three branches must at least acquiesce for a serious 
violation of constitutional liberty to proceed.”). 
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ever.223 That is a police state, precisely the sort of thing that we say 
cannot happen here. And it probably will not. The example is hy-
perbolic; the Hamdi Court commendably refused to take even the 
first step down this road. But I hope it illustrates the distortions 
that occur when the Court announces decision rules as operative 
propositions, and the worse harms that follow when others believe 
it. 
C. Judicial Sovereignty 
One of the virtues of the decision rules perspective is that it al-
lows us to see how judicial supremacy in constitutional interpreta-
tion can coexist with fairly robust forms of departmentalism or 
popular constitutionalism. Under the pre-Lopez Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, the question of whether a given activity substantially 
affected interstate commerce was left to Congress in the first in-
stance with deferential judicial review.224 Under the approach to 
equal protection adopted in cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson, 
the Court gave weight to congressional determinations that par-
ticular forms of discrimination were invidious.225 In each case, the 
Court remained the master of the meaning of the Constitution, but 
the Court’s decision rules granted substantial power to other ac-
tors, either by allocating primary decisionmaking authority to an 
entity other than the Court or by heeding other views in the craft-
ing of decision rules. As Professor Sager put it, the model “depicts 
a vision of judicial and legislative cooperation in the molding of 
concrete standards through which elusive and complex constitu-
tional norms . . . can come to be applied.”226
If the distinction between decision rules and operative proposi-
223 In Hamdi, the Executive did assert essentially unreviewable authority to detain 
Americans, and one might plausibly ask whether I am not asking readers to imagine 
this world. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2639. There is a crucial difference, 
however. The Executive was arguing for this proposition as a decision rule—it was 
arguing that courts could not second-guess executive determinations that a given indi-
vidual was an enemy combatant. It was not arguing for the constitutional power to 
detain anyone other than enemy combatants. A lack of judicial review would give the 
Executive this power as a practical matter, but it would not exist as a constitutional 
matter unless the decision rule came to be understood as an operative proposition. 
224 See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
225 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973). 
226 Sager, supra note 19, at 1240. 
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tions is lost, this sort of cooperation seems illegitimate, or defensi-
ble only on the grounds that non-judicial actors have independent 
authority to interpret the Constitution. Thus, Professors Post and 
Siegel argue that “Section [Five] is a structural device that fosters 
the democratic legitimacy of our constitutional order. . . . [by link-
ing] the legal interpretations of courts to the constitutional under-
standings of the American people, as expressed through their cho-
sen representatives.”227 This is quite consistent with a model on 
which Congress may legislate to deter or remedy invidious dis-
crimination—conduct that violates the operative proposition un-
derlying the Equal Protection Clause—rather than merely conduct 
that violates the Court’s decision rules. Yet Professors Post and 
Siegel argue instead for a model that “attributes equal interpretive 
authority to Congress and to the Court” so that “Congress does not 
violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts Section 
[Five] legislation premised on an understanding of the Constitution 
that differs from the Court’s.”228 This claim is stronger and far more 
controversial. I do not mean to suggest that it is wrong, only that it 
is unnecessary to the argument that the views of other branches 
should have some weight.229 In the Section Five context, as in all the 
doctrinal areas I have considered, the Court may guard its interpre-
tive supremacy with respect to operative propositions as jealously 
as it wishes. The possibility for cooperation and dialogue between 
the branches still exists as long as the Court understands that deci-
sion rules are not the same thing. 
When the Court forgets this—when it comes to believe that the 
meaning of the Constitution is exhaustively specified by a list of 
what judges will uphold or strike down—it denies nonjudicial ac-
tors their appropriate role in implementing the Constitution. In 
Morrison and Lopez, the Court recoiled from the idea that the 
question of whether a law fell within the bounds of the commerce 
power might be primarily within the legislative competence.230 
Garrett and Kimel similarly anathematized the suggestion that 
Congress might find unconstitutional a practice that the Court 
227 Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at 1945. 
228 Id. at 1947. 
229 For another example, see McConnell, supra note 33, at 171. 
230 See supra Section VI.A.1. 
ROOSEVELT_BOOK 10/27/2005  6:18 PM 
1718 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1649 
 
would not strike down.231 But in neither case was the issue really 
whether the Court would have the last word on the subject. It was 
whether the Court would have the only word. 
The Court’s reluctance to accept the idea that other branches 
might have something useful to say stems in large part from its 
supposition that independent interpretation of the Constitution is 
the only form such contributions could take. That supposition, of 
course, comes directly from the confusion of decision rules and op-
erative propositions, the belief that the Constitution is what the 
Court does. It also is driven in part by a fear that Congress does 
not take its responsibilities seriously, a fear that to some extent ap-
pears justified.232 Judicial deference breeds indifference to the re-
sponsibility to make an independent assessment of constitutional-
ity. That is how the substantial effects test led to the unthinking 
invocation of the commerce power epitomized by the findings-free 
Gun Free School Zones Act. 
But judicial contempt will breed indifference as well. If the 
Court refuses to pay any attention to the assessments Congress 
does make—to the findings of effects on commerce supporting the 
Violence Against Women Act or the findings of invidious discrimi-
nation supporting the ADA and ADEA—members of Congress 
might justifiably wonder why they should bother. If the Court is 
concerned that Congress does not take its responsibilities seriously, 
the appropriate thing to do would be to adopt deliberation-forcing 
rules, deferring to the legislative competency only if some evidence 
exists that the competency actually has been employed. The 
Court’s current approach is just as likely to deaden the congres-
sional sense of constitutional responsibility. 
The same is true of the Court’s relationship to the people. Writ-
ing of judicial review generally, Professor Thayer warned of its 
power to “dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden 
its sense of moral responsibility.”233 Just as Congress might be dis-
heartened by judicial disdain for its attempts to think seriously 
about constitutional questions, so too might be the people. A con-
231 See supra notes 204–12 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra text accompanying note 12. For a discussion of the interpretive compe-
tency of Congress, see generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 50 Duke L.J. 1335, 1373–74 (2001). 
233 James Bradley Thayer, John Marshall 107 (1901). 
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gressional decision to leave the Constitution entirely to the Court 
is troubling, but a similar popular abdication would be worse. 
Dissenting in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, Justice Scalia lamented the popular attempts to influence 
judicial opinion. “How upsetting it is,” he wrote, “that so many of 
our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this 
abortion issue, and on various sides of other issues as well) think 
that we Justices should properly take into account their views.”234 
Popular sentiment was beside the point, Justice Scalia argued, for 
the Supreme Court was, or should be, “doing essentially lawyers’ 
work” and “ascertaining an objective law.”235
Justice Scalia’s vision of constitutional decisionmaking as ordi-
nary adjudication is not, and has never been, an accurate one. The 
Constitution is not ordinary law, created by the government and 
entrusted to judges. It is higher law, created by the people, and it 
does not belong to courts alone. Constitutional adjudication is shot 
through with value choices. Judges are called upon to decide 
whether a governmental purpose is legitimate; whether an act is 
reasonable, arbitrary, or conscience-shocking; whether a form of 
discrimination is justified or invidious. To make these decisions 
without reference to current societal understandings—to make 
them from the perspective of eternity or 1789—is as impossible as 
it is misguided.236 Social movements always have affected the way 
that judges view such questions, and there is nothing illegitimate 
about it.237 We must not lose sight of the fact that it is not just a 
Constitution the Court is expounding. It is our Constitution, and 
judges can no more sever its application from popular understand-
ings than they can tell us who we are. 
234 505 U.S. 833, 999–1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
235 Id. at 1000. 
236 See Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People, supra 211, at 28 
(“The Constitution . . . does not live in our society as mere ukase. Disputes about the 
Constitution often raise deep questions of social meaning and collective identity that 
are not of a kind that a democratic society settles autocratically.”). 
237 See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 160 (1999) (“With a Constitution made in the name of ‘We the 
People,’ all of us are legitimately interested in the meaning of the Constitution—all of 
us must be welcome participants in the conversation.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have been critical of some recent decisions. The 
main point of the Article, however, is not to argue that particular 
decisions are right or wrong. It is to offer a different perspective on 
the creation and evolution of constitutional doctrine. That perspec-
tive allows for analysis and evaluation of doctrine, but it does not 
commit one to any particular view of any particular case. Others 
may, as I have said, argue that different operative propositions un-
derlie particular constitutional provisions. Or they may argue that 
various factors support the creation of different decision rules than 
the ones I endorse. Those are matters about which reasonable 
people can differ, as my discussion of Smith and Boerne shows. 
The value of the decision rules model is that it allows us to iden-
tify a mistake I think no reasonable person should commit: the 
conflation of decision rules and operative propositions. No one 
should believe that the lack of a judicially enforceable limit means 
no limit exists. No one should believe that a decision rule must be 
symmetrical merely because an operative proposition is. There are 
arguments in favor of judicial enforcement or symmetry, but they 
must be given. When we discuss what a particular constitutional 
provision is supposed to do or why a particular rule is a good way 
to enforce that provision, we are engaged in a discussion that can 
be fruitful. When we announce that the substantial effects test is 
inconsistent with a government of enumerated powers, or that the 
Equal Protection Clause must treat all racial classifications as 
equivalent, we are either begging the question or making a cate-
gory mistake. I believe that the perspective of this Article facili-
tates fruitful discussions, and I offer my criticisms as the opening 
words of such a discussion. I hope and expect that they will not be 
the last. 
 
